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Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform
Greg Reilly*
Patent reform increasingly focuses on discovery. Discovery is
perceived as disproportionately expensive and burdensome in patent
cases. Excessive discovery is said to fuel so-called “patent trolls” and
impose an unhealthy tax on innovation and competition. These
supposedly exceptional problems have led to exceptional patent-only
reform proposals, such as delaying most discovery for over a year and
reversing the seventy-five-year-old allocation of discovery costs.
Treating patent litigation as exceptional has a siloing effect. Patent
reform debates ignore parallel debates over general civil litigation
reform that raise the same arguments about disproportionately
expensive and burdensome discovery and propose their own set of
reforms. This Article links patent reform to civil litigation reform,
arguing that patent discovery is not exceptional in its costs, supposed
effects, or causes. Instead, patent discovery is representative of a
subset of discovery-intensive civil cases. The main problem with
discovery in patent cases is not abusive tactics of “patent trolls” or
inherent technical complexity but rather complex and open-ended
remedial doctrines. Doctrinal complexity is not unique to patent
litigation.
Pinpointing the source of patent discovery problems also suggests a
solution—delaying costly and burdensome remedial discovery until
after liability is established. This solution need not be limited to patent
cases. Greater use of staged litigation—litigating and resolving some
potentially case-dispositive issues before any discovery or other
litigation occurs on more discovery-intensive issues—is a potentially
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valuable tool for reforming general civil litigation. Notably, staged
litigation preserves the plaintiff’s access to information and right to a
jury trial, overcoming objections to other efforts to reduce civil
litigation costs, like Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation is often seen as “different” from other civil litigation,
necessitating special patent-only rules that stray from general legal
principles even for issues arising in other contexts.1 Over the past
decade, the Supreme Court soundly rejected this “patent
exceptionalism,” reversing a series of patent-only procedural rules
adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2
Commentators largely praised the Supreme Court’s efforts “to draw
patent law back into the [mainstream] legal landscape.”3 Yet, in recent
years, Congress has engaged in its own form of “patent
exceptionalism,” debating and even passing patent-only procedures that
depart from general civil practice in areas like joinder, pleading, fee
shifting, and discovery.4 While the Federal Circuit’s patent-only rules
generally enhanced the enforcement of patent rights, Congress is
motivated by concerns about patent assertion entities—pejoratively
known as “patent trolls”5—and its patent-only reforms restrict
enforcement of patent rights.
Discovery is a chief target of this new form of “patent
exceptionalism.” Discovery is seen as uniquely problematic in patent
cases, with disproportionately high costs making it vulnerable to
abusive litigation that extracts cost-motivated settlements even for weak
claims.6 The ability to use high discovery costs to force meritless
settlements supposedly has fueled the rise of patent assertion entities,
which are said to burden innovation and competition.7 Arguing that
normal discovery rules are “obsolete, or at least inappropriate, for the

1. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1791, 1817–18 (2013).
2. Id. at 1818. The Federal Circuit has nationwide appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.
3. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP
THEORY 62, 71–72 (2013) (explaining recent Supreme Court interest in patent law based, in part,
on rejection of patent law exceptionalism and desire to connect patent law to other areas of law).
4. See generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652 (2013)
(describing patent-only joinder statute). Congress is currently debating patent-only pleading
requirements, fee shifting, and discovery reforms. See infra Part I.A.
5. The terms patent assertion entity (“PAE”), non-practicing entity (“NPE”), and patent troll
(“troll”) all refer to patent holders that do not manufacture products but instead commercialize
inventions through licensing or litigating patent rights. Though the terms have slightly different
connotations, they are often used interchangeably. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan,
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425,
426 (2014) (summarizing terminology). This Article uses the term patent assertion entity or PAE
but it is intended to cover entities referred to as NPEs or trolls as well.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part II.B.
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vast complexity and volume of large patent disputes,”8 patent reformers
propose fundamental patent-only changes to discovery, including
delaying almost all discovery until approximately a year after filing and
departing from the seventy-five-year-old presumption that the
responding party bear its own discovery costs.9
But the premise underlying these significant patent-only variations is
largely untested. Is discovery in patent cases fundamentally different
from discovery in other civil litigation? In general, litigation discovery
is understudied by academics: “[O]n no other topic is there more
disconnect between the academy and bar.”10 Patent discovery is no
exception, lacking careful consideration of the problems, causes, and
potential solutions of costly discovery in patent cases.
This Article undertakes that task. In doing so, it draws patent
discovery reform back into the mainstream legal landscape by
connecting it to debates over reform of civil discovery more generally.
While discovery is a relatively new part of the patent reform agenda, it
has been a target of civil litigation reformers since the 1970s. These
reformers have long raised the exact same concerns now motivating
patent discovery reform: disproportionate costs, cost-motivated
settlements, incentives to bring weak claims, and unscrupulous
plaintiffs who leverage high discovery costs to enrich themselves at the
expense of innovation, competition, and the American economy. 11 The
most recent iteration of civil discovery reform resulted in amendments
to the Federal Rules Civil of Procedure—set to go into effect in
December 2015—that emphasize proportionality in discovery. 12
Despite being motivated by the same concerns and occurring
contemporaneously, civil discovery reform and patent reform have been
almost entirely siloed. Patent reform could benefit from the lessons of
civil litigation reform. The proposed patent reforms are largely “the
same, generic, anti-litigation solutions” that civil litigation reformers
have failed to pass more generally.13 Evaluating these reforms in the
8. Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 336 (2012).
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal But Could Be Better: The
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 892–93 (2009).
11. See infra Parts I.B, II.B.
12. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, apps. B-6 to -7 (2014) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT], http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/reports-judicial-conference-septem
ber-2014.
13. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 282 (2015).

REILLY (179-245).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Linking Patent & Civil Litigation Reform

10/9/2015 5:15 PM

183

full context of the decades-long debate over civil litigation reform could
avoid adoption of ineffectual or counter-productive policies rushed
through based on the perceived need to combat the “crisis” of patent
assertion entities or based on the self-interested lobbying of technology
companies most commonly targeted by patent assertion entities.14
Conversely, civil litigation reform could benefit from the data point
provided by discovery in patent cases. Patent litigation increasingly
looks like other civil litigation, with a small plaintiff (the patent
assertion entity) with limited discoverable information suing a large
corporation with limitless discoverable information. However, the
plaintiff in patent litigation (the patent assertion entity) tends to be less
sympathetic than the defendant (a technology company), the exact
opposite of other areas that tend to drive civil litigation reform like torts
and civil rights. Patent litigation thus offers a way to analyze civil
discovery problems and reforms without the normal biases and
ideological precommitments.15
Analyzing patent discovery in parallel with discovery in other civil
litigation raises questions about the assumptions motivating current
patent reform efforts. With regard to the discovery “problem,”
discovery costs in patent cases may seem exceptional when compared to
the median civil case, but they are on par with other civil cases of
similar stakes. High discovery costs are not a patent problem but rather
a general problem of complex, high stakes “mega cases.”16 Nor does
the rise of patent assertion entities make patent litigation fundamentally
different from other civil litigation. In many ways, complaints about
patent assertion entities echo those made about contingent-fee plaintiffs’
lawyers in other civil litigation, who are alleged to bring unmeritorious
claims and use high discovery costs to “extort” cost-of-defense
settlements.17
Turning to the causes of problematic discovery, the abusive practices
of patent assertion entities are often blamed for expensive and
burdensome patent discovery. However, available empirical evidence
indicates that discovery costs are lower in cases brought by patent
assertion entities.18 This is unsurprising since these cases tend to
involve lower stakes and contingent-fee lawyers with an incentive to

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Parts I.C, IV.
See infra Parts I.C, IV.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.A.1.
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avoid “scorched-earth” litigation.19 Costly and expansive discovery in
patent cases also is attributed to the inherent technical complexity of
patent cases. However, the technical doctrines of infringement and
invalidity are narrow, objective inquiries not implicating knowledge,
intent, or motivation, exactly the opposite of the normal characteristics
of discovery-intensive issues.20
On the other hand, a major
contributor—perhaps the major contributor—of costly and expansive
discovery in patent cases is the remedial doctrines for determining
damages and “willful” infringement (which provides eligibility for
enhanced damages). These doctrines have the hallmarks of discoveryintensive issues: broad, open-ended, and heavily dependent on
subjective mental states.21 Of course, patent damages and willful
infringement doctrines are unique to patent cases. They are, however,
an example of broad substantive doctrines that create costly and
expansive litigation discovery, a phenomenon that also occurs in other
civil litigation contexts.
Applying the lessons learned from analyzing patent discovery in
parallel with discovery in other civil litigation, this Article proposes a
solution to the discovery problems in patent litigation and, perhaps, civil
litigation more generally: staged litigation. With staged litigation, the
merits of certain, potentially case-dispositive issues are resolved in their
entirety before any discovery or other litigation proceeds on more
discovery-intensive issues. For example, if the primary source of costly
and burdensome patent discovery is remedial complexity, then a
promising solution is to delay discovery on remedial issues until after
liability (infringement and noninvalidity) is established.22 Traces of
staged litigation exist in American civil litigation, but it is largely
overlooked and rarely used.23
Staged litigation provides a way to reduce litigation costs while
preserving broad substantive rights and doctrines. The case study of
patent discovery demonstrates that substantive legal rights and
doctrines—like the remedial doctrines of patent law—are as much to
blame for discovery problems as flaws in procedural mechanisms.24
Yet, the role of substantive law has been almost entirely ignored in
recent patent and civil litigation reform debates. As a result, the
19. See infra Part III.A.2.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See infra Part III.C.
22. See infra Part IV.C.2.
23. An important exception is Louis Kaplow’s recent pathbreaking work. Louis Kaplow,
Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179 (2013).
24. See infra Part IV.A.
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proposed reforms in both contexts are poorly tailored to the sources of
problematic discovery because they do not account for the broad rights
and doctrines provided by substantive law.25 By contrast, staged
litigation accounts for broad substantive rights and doctrines, while
reducing discovery costs, by apportioning the most expensive and
burdensome discovery necessitated by substantive law to those cases
where the plaintiff demonstrated some merit by prevailing on the initial
issues.26 Importantly, staged litigation also preserves both access to the
information necessary for the plaintiff to prove its case and the right to a
jury trial, overcoming objections to other civil litigation reforms like
heightened pleading requirements and lower discovery limits.27
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the parallel tracks
of patent and civil litigation reform and the divide separating them.28
Part II analyzes the costs and consequences of broad discovery, finding
patent litigation to be an example of a subset of complex, high-stakes
civil cases.29 Part III addresses the causes of discovery problems,
finding doctrinal complexity, not patent assertion entities or inherent
technical complexity, to be the main source of patent discovery
problems.30 Part IV then applies this analysis to discovery reform and
makes the preliminary case for applying staged litigation in both patent
cases and civil litigation more generally.31
I. PARALLEL PATENT AND CIVIL LITIGATION REFORM
Discovery is the pretrial exchange of information between the parties.
Pretrial discovery was “one of the most significant innovations of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” replacing a system based largely on
surprise with one that helped narrow and clarify the issues, provide
necessary information, and make trial predictable.32 Only “limited” and
“modest” changes have been made to the basic discovery regime
adopted in 1938.33 Discovery is the crucial stage of civil litigation,
where cases are won and lost,34 but it is also blamed for the high costs

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
1998).
34.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.1.
See infra Part IV.C.3.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1947).
8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed.
Moss, supra note 10, at 892.
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and problems of modern litigation.35 Discovery in patent litigation is no
different, described as both “the most important stage” and “the most
tedious, burdensome, and expensive part.”36 Discovery is a primary
focus of ongoing patent and civil litigation reform efforts. The
following sections describe these related, but siloed, reform efforts.
A. Patent Reform
Patent reform proponents suggest that “discovery in patent litigation
[is] a special case” that makes ordinary discovery procedures “obsolete,
or at least inappropriate, for the vast complexity and volume of large
patent disputes.”37 They object to “disproportionally high discovery
expenses,” with discovery costs ranging from $350,000 in lower stakes
cases to $3 million in higher stakes cases.38 Patent plaintiffs,
particularly patent assertion entities, purportedly have “an incentive to
apply ‘scorched earth’ techniques to force defendants to spend an
inordinate amount of time and energy collecting and producing volumes
of documents that are ultimately irrelevant to the merits of the case.”39
The volume and production costs of modern electronic communications
and electronically stored information are said to exacerbate this
problem.40 And the benefit from broad discovery is purportedly
minimal, with less than 1% of documents produced in discovery used in
patent litigation.41
Both the Federal Circuit and federal district courts have recently
implemented patent-only discovery reforms. The Federal Circuit
Advisory Council issued a model order with the goal of “streamlining ediscovery, particularly email production” and “requiring the

35. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 766–68 (2010).
36. KIMBERLY A. MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 156 (3d ed. 2008);
Manotti L. Jenkins, Putting the Clients in a Position to Succeed, in PATENT LITIGATION AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING KEY COMPONENTS OF A CASE,
EVALUATING SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES, AND PREPARING FOR TRIAL 157, 161 (2007).
37. Rader, supra note 8, at 336; Teri B. Varndell & R. Eugene Varndell, Jr., Changes in the
World of Patent Litigation: New Rules for Discovery and the Emergence of Patent Litigation
Investors, 34 IDEA 205, 224 (1994).
38. Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing] (statement of Dana Rao, Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Intellectual
Property and Litigation, Adobe Systems Incorporated); Rader, supra note 8, at 336.
39. Innovation Act: Hearing on H.R. 3309 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
20 (2013) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Krish Gupta, Senior Vice President and
Deputy General Counsel, EMC Corporation).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 32–33 (2013).
41. Id. at 32 n.55.
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responsible, targeted use of e-discovery in patent cases.”42 Individual
district courts also adopted special rules to limit e-discovery in patent
cases.43
In Congress, patent litigation reform, especially patent discovery
reform, is a high priority, with over a dozen bills introduced in recent
years.44 A package of patent litigation reforms overwhelmingly passed
the House of Representatives in late 201345 but was blocked in the
Senate at the last minute in spring 2014 by the leadership of the
Democratic majority.46 With Republicans taking control of the Senate
in January 2015, patent litigation reform was expected to pass in the
114th Congress.47 As of June 2015, overlapping, though not identical,
patent litigation reform bills had been approved by both the Senate and
House Judiciary Committees (the “PATENT Act” and “Innovation
Act,” respectively).48 Even if patent litigation reform does not pass
during the 114th Congress, the current reform proposals certainly will
influence subsequent proposals and reform efforts, as was true in past
phases of patent reform.49

42. FED. CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMM., AN E-DISCOVERY MODEL ORDER (2013),
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2013/08/ediscovery-model-order-1.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Randall E. Kay, District Amends Local Patent Rules, L.A. DAILY J. (Feb. 25,
2013), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/bc17b516-90f9-4583-a459-c17caa4d3c80/Pres
entation/PublicationAttachment/39b3ad9f-0b6b-418b-96d0-19c1046c30d9/Kay%20DJ%20article
%20re%20new%20patent%20local%20rules.pdf (describing model e-discovery order adopted by
U.S. District Court for Southern District of California).
44. Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS,
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patentreform-legislation/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
45. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (as passed by House, Dec. 5,
2013); Tom Risen, Bipartisan Innovation Act Clears House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 6,
2013, 11:46 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/06/bipartisan-innovation-actclears-house.
46. Dustin Volz, Why Harry Reid Blocked Patent Reform, NAT’L J. (May 21, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/why-harry-reid-blocked-patent-reform-20140521.
47. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2015: Republican Agenda, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 5,
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/11/patent-reform-republican.html (suggesting that under
Republican control, the question was not whether patent reform would occur, but instead how far
it would go).
48. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2015). House Bill 9 was reported favorably to the House by a vote of 24–8 of the
House Judiciary Committee on June 11, 2015. Markup of: H.R. 9, The Innovation Act, U.S.
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (June 11, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ID=2848E2C2-F705-4A03-800C-64930626A395.
Senate Bill 1137 was reported favorably to the Senate by a 16–4 vote of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Vocal Minority Cannot Keep PATENT Act from
Passing Senate Judiciary, IPWATCHDOG (June 5, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/
06/05/patent-act-passing-senate-judiciary/id=58418/.
49. Gugliuzza, supra note 13, at 282.
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The patent litigation reforms would raise pleading standards for
patent infringement and, most prominently, make it easier for the
prevailing party to recover its litigation fees and expenses from the
losing party.50 These reforms are motivated by the belief that high
patent discovery costs incentivize patentees, especially patent assertion
entities, to bring weak claims and accused infringers to settle even
meritorious defenses.51
The proposed reforms have directly addressed patent discovery in
two ways. First, as introduced, the House reforms would limit
discovery before the court interpreted the scope of the patent rights
(known as “claim construction” in patent lingo) only “to information
necessary for the court to determine the meaning of the terms used in
the patent claim.”52 Because claim construction is a key issue in
virtually all patent cases and can be case dispositive,53 a discovery stay
could prevent patent holders from using high discovery costs to extract
settlements for nonmeritorious claims based on fanciful interpretations
of the patent.54 On the other hand, delaying almost all discovery until
over a year after filing (the typical time to claim construction even in
fast jurisdictions) would be a significant, patent-only departure from
existing discovery norms, arguably conflicting with the Federal Rules’
commitment to “speedy” resolution.55 Later versions of the House
reforms adopted the Senate version of this proposal, which would also
postpone discovery, but only pending resolution of a motion to dismiss,
motion to transfer, or motion to sever, not pending claim construction.56
Second, both the House and Senate reforms instruct the Judicial
Conference of the United States to “develop rules and procedures . . . to
address the asymmetries in discovery burdens and costs” in patent

50. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (June 11, 2015)
[hereinafter House Amendment], http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/57d3eba8-347d-439b-ad
b8-b384210312eb/goodla-028-xml-managers-substitute-june-9-2015.pdf (Manager’s Amendment
#1 by Representative Goodlatte); Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to S. 1137, 114th
Cong. § 7 (June 4, 2015) [hereinafter Senate Amendment], http://www.judiciary.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/S.%201137%20Managers%27%20Amendment.pdf.
51. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 18–19, 21 (2013).
52. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 299A (1st Sess. 2015).
53. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis
of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON LAW 123, 125 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
54. Letter from Sixty-One Professors to Congress in Support of Patent Reform Legislation
(Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Professors’ Letter], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2359621.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (permitting discovery as soon as the
parties have met for their initial conference).
56. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 3(d); Senate Amendment, supra note 50, § 5.
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cases.57 Specifically, they suggest that the producing party should only
bear the cost of production of so-called “core” documentary evidence
and that the requesting party should bear the costs, including attorney’s
fees, of additional, so-called “non-core” documentary evidence
otherwise permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.58
Ultimately, both the House and Senate reforms left the definition of
core and non-core documentary evidence to the Judicial Conference.59
However, a definition of core documentary evidence included in
earlier versions of the House reforms is instructive of the type of
proposals that the Judicial Conference would likely consider. It
featured many of the types of information crucial to any patent dispute,
including documents related to the invention’s development, the
accused product’s technical operation, and prior art (i.e., existing
knowledge in the field used to invalidate the patent). 60 However, only
one category of core documentary evidence is directly related to
damages issues: “documents sufficient to show profit attributable to the
claimed invention.”61 Although unclear, this category almost certainly
did not include the broad swath of information necessary to prove
damages under existing law.62 As a result, under this proposal, every
patentee filing a patent infringement claim would have to pay the
accused infringer’s costs for a significant amount of the discovery
required for a necessary element of a patent infringement claim.
The proposed patent-only allocation of discovery costs would be a
fundamental change to discovery. “[S]ince the adoption of the Federal
Rules in 1938, the allocation of discovery costs has been governed by
the presumption that the party from whom the information is sought—
the producing party—must bear the expenses associated with the
fulfillment of its opponent’s discovery requests.”63 Moreover, under the
Federal Rules’ discovery regime, parties can obtain discovery of all
relevant information on equal terms without imposed judgments about
what information is more or less important.64 Because the discovery
cost shifting would apply in every case, even to the most meritorious

57. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 6(a)(2); Senate Amendment, supra note 50, § 6(a)(1).
58. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 6; Senate Amendment, supra note 50, § 6.
59. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 6(a)(3)(C); Senate Amendment, supra note 50,
§ 6(a)(3).
60. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 296(3)(A) (1st Sess. 2015).
61. Id.
62. See infra Part III.C (discussing remedial complexity and discovery problems).
63. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation
and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2011).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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patentees, it arguably represents a more dramatic departure from
ordinary civil litigation than even the Innovation Act’s general feeshifting provisions, which only apply to losing patentees.
B. Civil Litigation Reform
Discovery may be a recent addition to the patent reform agenda, but
for three decades, civil litigation reformers have sought to limit the
scope and amount of discovery.65 The arguments for limiting patent
discovery echo long-standing arguments for limiting civil discovery
generally.
Proponents of civil discovery reform—such as tort reform
proponents, the business community, and ideological conservatives 66—
contend that “[d]iscovery abuse continues to be a serious problem in the
American civil justice system and is rapidly growing more
pernicious.”67 The “costs of discovery in civil litigation” are said to be
“too often out of proportion to the issues at stake in the litigation.”68
Discovery costs constitute about half of all civil litigation costs; in
higher stakes cases, they constitute 90% of total litigation costs and onethird of the amount at stake.69 Reform proponents blame “[p]laintiffs’
attorneys routinely burden[ing] defendants with costly discovery
requests and engag[ing] in open-ended fishing expeditions.”70
Practitioners and other commentators contend that the volume and
production costs of modern electronic communications and
electronically stored information exacerbate this problem.71 And the
benefit from broad discovery is purportedly minimal, with only one out
of every 1044 pages of produced documents actually used at trial.72
Largely endorsing these concerns, the Judicial Conference adopted
amendments to the civil discovery rules that emphasize proportionality
in discovery, which will go into effect, absent congressional action, in
December 2015.73 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 currently defines

65. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2014).
66. Id. at 1867–71.
67. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 594 (2010).
68. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-5.
69. Moss, supra note 10, at 892.
70. Beisner, supra note 67, at 549.
71. Id. at 563–77.
72. Id. at 574.
73. The amendments also eliminate the court’s power to order discovery relevant to the
“subject matter,” not just a claim or defense, a provision that was “virtually never used.” Due to
concern that it was mistakenly defining the standard for discoverable information, the
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discoverable information as “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense.”74 The amendments add the further
requirement that it be “proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit.”75
Compared to the proposed patent discovery reforms, the Federal
Rules amendments are minor, focused on reorganization and
reemphasis.76 Proportionality has been described as “old news”
because the Federal Rules already require the court to “limit the
frequency or extent of discovery” whenever “the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”77 The reforms’
main effect is a subtle, though perhaps important, shift in how
proportionality is raised. Instead of requiring a court order to avoid
discovery based on proportionality, the amendments allow a responding
party to object to a discovery request as disproportional and beyond the
scope of discoverable information, forcing the requesting party to move
to compel to obtain the information.78 Notably, the reforms reaffirm the
basic discovery regime in place since 1938. While mentioning the
existing authority “to allow discovery only on condition that the
requesting party bear part or all of the costs of responding,” the
amendments emphasize that “this clarification does not mean that costshifting should become a common practice. The assumption remains
that the responding party ordinarily bears the costs of responding.”79
The Federal Rules amendments have sparked strong opposition in the

amendments replace the description of relevant information as being “reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” with a statement that relevant information need not
be admissible at trial. The amendments make several other minor and uncontroversial changes.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-5 to -7, -9 to -19, -30 to -31.
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
75. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-5.
76. See Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality
in Discovery 1–2 (Oct. 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Georgia Law Review
and available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2551520) (describing amendments as “organizational
changes”).
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see Moss, supra note 10, at 905 (noting that the problem
with proportionality limits on discovery is not that they are old news, but that such limits have
never worked terribly well and appear unlikely to work well for e-discovery).
78. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al. on Proposed Amendments to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0622.
79. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-10 to -11.
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procedural community.80 Reform opponents point to a study by the
Federal Judicial Center showing that discovery costs in the median civil
case are minimal.81 They question the wisdom of “across the board
limits on discovery” to address “the small number of complex,
contentious, high-stakes cases where costs are high” and fear the
amendments “are likely to undermine meaningful access to the courts
and to impede enforcement of federal- and state-recognized substantive
rights.”82
C. The Divide Between Patent and Civil Litigation Reform
Patent reform debates generally assume, explicitly or implicitly, that
costly and burdensome discovery is unique to patent cases, or at least
worse than in other civil litigation.83 Despite overlap in the motivating
problems, timing, and potential effects, only passing references have
been made to civil discovery reform in the patent reform debates.84
Perhaps this is because the patent academics, practitioners, and even
defendants85 advocating for patent reform are specialists prone to
ignoring other areas of law and viewing their specialized area as
exceptional.86 Or it could be a conscious lobbying strategy. Most of
the proposed patent reforms are “the same, generic, anti-litigation
solutions” frequently invoked and largely rejected to remedy past

80. See, e.g., Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78 (urging Judicial
Conference to reject Federal Rules amendments because they would be “ineffectual,” “increase
costs to litigants and the court system,” “spawn confusion and create incentives for wasteful
discovery disputes,” “undermine meaningful access to the courts,” and “impede enforcement of
federal- and state-recognized substantive rights”); Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68
VAND. L. REV. 855, 856 (2015), (“A controversial set of amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure will likely come into effect within six months.”).
81. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78.
82. Id.
83. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 19 (2013) (quoting witness testimony before the committee:
“While this type of [discovery] abuse no doubt exists in other types of litigation, it may be more
effective in patent litigation . . . .”); Rader, supra note 8, at 336 (“Patent cases, in particular,
produce disproportionally high discovery expenses.”); Professors’ Letter, supra note 54
(assuming costly and burdensome discovery is a problem of patent law).
84. See Senate Hearing, supra note 38, at 19, 41 (statements of Dana Rao, Vice President and
Associate General Counsel of Intellectual Property and Litigation, Adobe Systems, Incorporated,
and Steve Bossone, Ph.D., Vice President, Intellectual Property, Alnylam Pharmaceuticals)
(noting applicability of Federal Judicial Conference reforms to patent cases); see also Gugliuzza,
supra note 13, at 282 (suggesting that general civil litigation reform may make patent reform
unnecessary).
85. Many corporations pushing patent discovery reforms are technology companies for whom
patent litigation may be more common than other forms of litigation.
86. Cf. J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1095 (2014) (noting
shortcomings of specialized courts).
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litigation “crises” in other areas of law.87 For patent reform proponents,
connecting patent reform to civil litigation reform could invoke the
organized opposition, political considerations, and policy interests that
have stymied more comprehensive civil litigation reform in recent
decades.88 They have better prospects of success if they portray a
problem unique to patent litigation—emphasizing the role of the
politically and publicly unpopular “patent troll”—and propose patentspecific reforms that purportedly have no bearing on other civil
litigation. Reform opponents presumably would rather deny there is
any problem than argue that patent litigation is just one example of a
larger problem.89
Tunnel vision also runs in the opposite direction. The civil discovery
reform debates ignore the contemporaneous complaints about patent
discovery and the accompanying legislative proposals.90 This may be
because civil litigation reformers are simply unaware of patent reform
or it may be because they accept claims that patent discovery is unique
and exceptional. Perhaps this is unsurprising, since patent litigation
seems like a niche field, a technically complex battle between corporate
interests with little relevance to civil rights, products liability, or the
other types of cases that tend to drive civil litigation reform. 91 On the
other hand, for proponents of civil litigation reform, patent litigation
offers a perfect example of high discovery costs and a vivid example of
the purported consequences of problematic discovery: patent trolls.92
For opponents of civil litigation reform, the patent reform proposals are
a good example of an alternative to the “across-the-board limits” and

87. Gugliuzza, supra note 13, at 282.
88. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1562–67 (2014) (describing political obstacles that have prevented
enactment of comprehensive civil litigation reform).
89. Patent reform has not been totally ignored by organized interest groups that normally
oppose civil litigation reform; some have blamed trial lawyers for blocking patent reform in the
Senate. Brian Fung, Who’s Behind the Last-Minute Push to Thwart Patent Reform?, WASH.
POST (May 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/21/whosbehind-the-last-minute-push-to-thwart-patent-reform/.
90. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Rationalizing Cost Allocation in Civil Discovery 2 (Jan. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia School of Law and available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2557613) (arguing that what “may be coming
next” for civil litigation reform is “an undoing of the producer-pays presumption itself” without
mentioning patent reform).
91. Cf. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64
ALA. L. REV. 335, 346–51 (2012) (describing traditional differences between patent and other
civil litigation).
92. See infra Part II.
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“untargeted amendments” they oppose.93
This siloing of patent reform and civil litigation reform is
problematic. At the very least, there is a potential for knowledge
exchange between the parallel tracks of discovery reform. Moreover,
for patent reform, isolation from civil litigation reform could lead to
suboptimal policy. Many of the patent reform proposals have already
been vetted in the context of civil litigation reform, with input from a
wide range of interests with different knowledge and viewpoints.94 By
contrast, patent reform is being pushed largely by high technology
companies that are the most popular targets of patent assertion
entities.95 The self-interest of these companies, combined with the rush
to combat the perceived “crisis” of patent assertion entities, could lead
to ineffectual or counterproductive policies that would have seemed less
appealing if evaluated in the full context of the decades-long experience
with civil litigation reform.96
Likewise, isolation from patent reform eliminates a valuable data
point for civil litigation reform. Patent litigation is now a mainstream
part of the federal civil docket.97 The volume of patent cases is much
greater than securities and antitrust cases, two areas that frequently
influence civil litigation reform.98 Problems common in other civil
litigation increasingly arise in patent litigation—including asymmetric
possession of information between the small plaintiff (i.e., a patent
assertion entity) and large corporate defendant.99
Moreover, the proposed patent litigation reforms would be significant
departures from the trans-substantive norm in procedural rules—i.e., the
idea that the same procedures apply regardless of subject matter.100
Therefore, the proposed reforms, their motivations, and their potential
shortcomings would all seem to be valuable evidence in the on-going
93. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78.
94. For example, “loser pays” fee-shifting proposals have been proposed, debated, and
rejected in general civil litigation reform for decades. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 88, at
1562.
95. Fung, supra note 89.
96. Gugliuzza, supra note 13, at 292 (suggesting that the patent discovery reform proposals
are “substantively flawed”).
97. John R. Thomas, Into a Silver Age: U.S. Patent Law 1992–2012, 23 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 525, 538–40 (2013).
98. U.S. COURTS, TABLE C., U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/federal-judicialcaseload
-statistics/2014/03/31.
99. See infra Part II.A.1.
100. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 1191 (discussing concept of, and debate over, trans-substantive rules).
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debates as to whether, and to what extent, procedural design should
abandon the trans-substantive norm.
Finally, the civil litigation community ignores patent reform at its
own peril. Many of the patent reform proposals are the same
procedures anti-litigation interests have tried, and continue to try, 101 to
implement more generally. In fact, the present round of patent reform
looks eerily similar to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (“PSLRA”), which included both heightened pleading
requirements and discovery stays102 and was motivated by supposedly
abusive securities litigation brought by plaintiffs’ lawyers to extort
settlements.103 The PSLRA was passed largely due to lobbying from
Silicon Valley technology firms—the very same interests pushing
patent reform104—which in the 1990s argued that “they were the
victims of too many frivolous class action securities fraud lawsuits,”
just like they now argue that they are the victims of too many frivolous
patent lawsuits.105 Many in the procedural community objected to the
PSLRA as departing from generally applicable procedural rules,
hindering access to courts, and undermining more comprehensive
procedural development.106
The present patent reform efforts may represent another step by antilitigation forces to achieve incrementally, subject area by subject area,
reforms that they have not been able to achieve comprehensively.
Patent reform thus could become a Trojan Horse, with radical changes
to civil litigation quietly introduced in the patent context and then
portrayed as unexceptional when proposed more generally. Indeed, the
agenda for the next round of civil litigation reform (subsequent to the
amendments set to go into effect in December 2015) includes discussion
of whether to adopt “requestor pays” discovery provisions, in part
because “aspects of ‘requester pays’ are included in some legislative
proposals dealing with ‘patent trolls’ that have been introduced in
Congress.”107
101. See Spencer, supra note 90 (manuscript at 2) (arguing that “undoing of the producer-pays
presumption” for discovery is next on agenda for civil litigation reformers).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b) (2012).
103. See Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms, 30 CONN. L. REV. 537, 550–
53 (1998) (“Congress meant for the [PSLRA] modifications to restrict the amount of abusive
securities litigation, particularly lawsuits which are lawyer-driven or are brought to extract
settlements.”).
104. Fung, supra note 89.
105. Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical
Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 449 (2012).
106. Tobias, supra note 103, at 550–53, 564.
107. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AGENDA BOOK FOR MEETING OF
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II. COMPARING THE PROBLEMS OF PATENT AND CIVIL DISCOVERY
Having identified the divide currently separating patent reform and
civil litigation reform, this Part and the next Part challenge what appears
to be driving this divide: the belief that discovery in patent cases is
somehow different from discovery in other civil litigation. This Part
shows that both the costs and consequences of discovery in patent
litigation are similar to other, similar-stakes civil cases. Part III
concludes that the most likely cause of patent discovery problems is
doctrinal complexity, a problem not unique to patent law.
A. The Costs of Patent and Civil Discovery
The primary justification for patent-specific discovery reform is the
high costs and burdens of discovery in patent cases.108 Patent cases are
notoriously expensive, and discovery is a major component of these
costs.109 Median costs through the end of discovery are $350,000 when
less than $1 million is at stake, $1 million when $1–10 million is at
stake, $2 million when $10–25 million is at stake, and $3 million when
more than $25 million is at stake.110
Patent reform proponents emphasize the asymmetry in the
distribution of these costs. Because patent defendants tend to possess
“the bulk of the relevant evidence,” they have higher discovery costs
than the patent holder.111 Litigation brought by patent assertion entities
probably accentuates this asymmetry. Patent assertion entities normally
are small operations focused just on licensing and litigation that have
few relevant witnesses, documents, or other evidence.112
Complaints about high discovery costs are not unique to patent
litigation. Many “lament the ‘twin scourges’ of the federal civil
litigation system—namely, cost and delay—concerns that apparently
affect other legal systems and whose existence can be traced back to

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, tab 9A, at 333–38 (Apr. 9–10, 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV201504.pdf.
108. See supra Part I.A.
109. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1. Median litigation costs in patent cases range from
$700,000 in lower stakes cases to $5.5 million in higher stakes cases. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, at I-129 (2013) [hereinafter AIPLA].
110. AIPLA, supra note 109, at 35.
111. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Neil Bros. Ltd. v.
World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)); Thomas M. Lenard, Patent
Reform 2.0, HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Nov. 1, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/technology/188899-patent-reform-20.
112. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–33 (2013).
THE
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ancient times.”113 This narrative of cost and delay, most often blamed
on discovery, has driven civil litigation reform for over three
decades.114 Asymmetric discovery costs, like those in cases brought by
patent assertion entities, are common in civil litigation.115 The Judicial
Conference has explained:
One party—often an individual plaintiff—may have very little
discoverable information. The other party may have vast amounts of
information, including information that can be readily retrieved and
information that is more difficult to retrieve. In practice these
circumstances often mean that the burden of responding to discovery
lies heavier on the party who has more information, and properly
so.116

Despite these similarities to civil discovery generally, patent reform
proponents further argue
that
“[p]atent cases . . . produce
disproportionally high discovery expenses.”117 They are unclear as to
what the discovery costs are disproportionate to. Total patent litigation
costs? General civil litigation costs? The stakes? The complexity? Of
course, the lack of “proportionality” in discovery is also the prime
motivator of the current round of civil litigation reforms.118
Federal Judicial Center research does suggest that intellectual
property cases (of which patent cases are likely the most expensive)
have 62% higher litigation costs than the baseline, even when
controlling for a variety of factors.119 However, disproportionate
litigation costs do not necessarily mean that patent cases have
disproportionate discovery costs. Patent cases could have exceptional

113. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 54 (2010).
114. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its
Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1094–101 (2012).
115. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE
PATENT QUALITY 10 n.22 (2013) [hereinafter GAO] (“[A]symmetrical discovery demands,
burdens, and costs are not unique to NPE patent infringement litigation. For example, parties in
class actions and antitrust litigation typically face the same asymmetry.”); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1987) (describing a cost differential in favor of
plaintiffs in civil discovery because “there is relatively little to be learned from the lead
plaintiff”).
116. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-40 to -41.
117. Rader, supra note 8, at 336 (emphasis added).
118. See supra Part I.B.
119. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2–3, 8 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.
pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf.
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litigation costs for reasons unrelated to discovery, such as greater use of
expert witnesses, more extensive and voluminous summary judgment
motions, or more complex trials. Focusing more specifically on
discovery costs, a comparison of practitioner responses to separate
surveys of discovery costs in patent litigation by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) and in civil litigation
by the Federal Judicial Center can help evaluate whether
“proportionality” is a more serious problem in patent discovery than
other civil discovery.120
Comparing patent litigation to the median civil case suggests that
patent discovery is unusually costly and burdensome. In the median
civil case, total costs were only estimated as $15,000 (for plaintiffs) to
$20,000 (for defendants), with discovery costs constituting 20% (for
plaintiffs) to 27% (for defendants) of total litigation costs and only 1.6%
(for plaintiffs) to 3.3% (for defendants) of the stakes.121 In patent
litigation, costs through the end of discovery were consistently reported
as between 50% and 60% of total litigation costs. 122 Even using the
most conservative estimate, discovery costs in patent litigation were
reported as at least 8% of the stakes, 250% greater than in the median
civil case.123
However, the stakes of the median civil case were only $160,000 (for
plaintiffs) to $200,000 (for defendants),124 which would be an
exceptionally low stakes patent case.125 For comparison, the AIPLA’s

120. The AIPLA and Federal Judicial Center studies are the primary empirical data relied
upon in debates over patent reform and civil litigation reform, respectively. See, e.g., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-6 (relying on FJC survey); Mark A. Lemley & A.
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2162 n.187
(2013) (relying on AIPLA survey). The FJC survey asks for discovery costs, whereas the AIPLA
asks for costs through the end of discovery, which would include pleadings, case investigation,
and other preliminary matters. This difference would increase the AIPLA costs relative to the
FJC costs, reinforcing the point in the text that patent discovery costs are not disproportionate
compared to civil discovery costs.
121. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 38–39, 43 (2009).
122. AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -132.
123. Id. The AIPLA report provides a single median cost through the end of discovery for
various ranges of stakes. The conservative estimate relies on the median discovery costs for the
$1–10 million range ($1 million) divided by the upper bound of the range ($10 million), or 10%,
and the median discovery costs from the $10–25 million range ($2 million) divided by the upper
bound of the range ($25 million), or 8%.
124. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 121, at 42.
125. John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent-Infringement
Injunctions, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2099–105 (2014) (describing patent cases with monetary
awards of $350,000 and even $570,536 as “[patent] cases involving relatively modest monetary
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lowest category encompassed all patent cases with less than $1 million
at stake.126 Since the monetary stakes are the best predictor of both
total litigation and discovery costs, 127 higher stakes patent litigation
should have significantly higher discovery costs than the lower-stakes
median civil case.
The 95th percentile of civil cases is more similar to patent litigation,
with stakes in the $4–5 million range.128 In these cases, discovery costs
were reported as 80% of total litigation costs,129 compared to the 50%
of total costs incurred through the end of discovery in patent cases with
$1–10 million at stake.130 Discovery costs in the 95th percentile of civil
cases were also reported as 25-30% of the stakes.131 In patent litigation
with similar stakes, discovery costs were reported as 20% of the
stakes.132
Thus, patent discovery only seems extraordinarily expensive when
not accounting for the stakes of the litigation. Discovery in patent
litigation is on par with discovery in other civil litigation of similar
stakes. Whether discovery in high-stakes cases is properly calibrated or
is excessive is an important, and very difficult, question. But it is not a
patent question. “[T]he problem with excessive discovery is—and has
always been—more pervasive with respect to a particular slice of ‘mega
cases,’ approximately five to fifteen percent of the civil caseload.”133
Patent litigation is just one example of this “small subset” of “complex,
contentious, high stakes cases” where discovery is widely seen as
problematic.134
B. The Consequences of Patent and Civil Discovery
Patent discovery is seen as problematic not just because of the costs
themselves but also because the consequences of these costs. The high

stakes”).
126. AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -132.
127. Lee & Willging, supra note 35, at 772; Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of
Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV.
525, 549–50 (1998).
128. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 121, at 42.
129. Id. at 38–39.
130. AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -130.
131. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 121, at 43.
132. The median discovery costs in the AIPLA’s $1–10 million stakes category is $1 million.
Assuming a relatively smooth cost curve in this category, this provides a rough estimate of the
costs in a case at the median of the category, i.e., with $5 million at stake. AIPLA, supra note
109, at I-129.
133. Subrin & Main, supra note 65, at 1850.
134. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78.
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patent discovery costs purportedly provide defendants “a strong
incentive to fold and settle patent suits early, even when they believe the
claims against them are meritless.”135 Patentees, especially patent
assertion entities, consequently have incentives to bring weak claims,
knowing that defendants will settle even nonmeritorious claims for less
than the cost of defense.136 The asymmetry in discovery costs between
patent assertion entities and accused infringers is said to provide patent
assertion entities leverage in settlement discussions and incentivize
excessive discovery requests.137 In fact, some argue that the problem of
patent trolls “stems largely from” high discovery and other litigation
costs.138 On this view, the push for patent-specific discovery reform is
unsurprising. Most commentators believe that patent assertion entities
“impose[] substantial direct costs on high-tech innovators with little
apparent offsetting benefit to inventors or innovators”139 and “have had
a negative impact on innovation and economic growth.”140
However, a vigorous debate continues on whether patent assertion
entities are as problematic as commonly thought. 141 Even assuming so,
discovery costs may not be a significant source of this problem. A
variety of factors are blamed for the rise of patent assertion entities, and
it is uncertain how much responsibility to attribute to discovery costs as
opposed to, for example, uncertain patent scope or the potential for high
damages awards.142 At least some patent assertion entities, so called
“lottery ticket” trolls, are not seeking “cost of defense” settlements but

135. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1.
136. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–32 (2013) (suggesting that overly burdensome
discovery requests force defendants to settle simply to avoid the costs of discovery); Professors’
Letter, supra note 54, at 1 (“Companies accused of infringement, thus, have a strong incentive
[from high discovery costs] to fold and settle patent suits early, even when they believe the claims
against them are meritless.”).
137. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–33.
138. Randall R. Rader et al., Opinion, Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2013, at A25.
139. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 387, 388 (2014).
140. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION
AND U.S. INNOVATION 2 (2013) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT].
141. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 5, at 427 (arguing that “there is little hard data, and
much of the data that exists is mixed or inconclusive,” as to the effect of patent assertion entities);
see also Michael J. Mazzeo et al., Do NPEs Matter?: Non-Practicing Entities and Patent
Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 879, 904 (2013) (arguing that whether patent
assertion entities “are good or bad for technology innovation remains an open question” and that
“the vertical separation of patent rights from technology embodied by PAEs could have important
advantages”).
142. See GAO, supra note 115, at 28–34 (discussing potential causes of rise of patent
assertion entities litigation).
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instead “hope[] to strike it big in court”143 Their business model does
not depend on imposing high discovery costs on defendants.
To be sure, some patent assertion entities do rely on high discovery
costs. These “bottom-feeder” trolls “are interested in quick, low-value
settlements” and “rely on the high cost of patent litigation . . . to induce
the parties they sue to settle for small amounts of money rather than pay
millions to their lawyers.”144 The concern with these bottom feeder
trolls is not settlements based on high discovery costs per se, but rather
the merits of the claims they bring. If these claims were meritorious,
settlements that avoid the costs of litigation would be socially desirable,
since litigation costs are deadweight losses. However, the concern is
that high discovery costs induce defendants to settle even nonmeritorious cases for less than the cost of defense. The problem, then,
is the result of two factors: (1) low merit claims, and (2) high discovery
costs. As a result, it is not illogical that those concerned with patent
assertion entities, especially bottom-feeder trolls, seek reforms focused
on reducing discovery costs. Yet, discovery reforms are not well
positioned to distinguish between low-merit and meritorious cases. For
example, the currently proposed discovery reforms apply equally to the
most meritorious and the least meritorious cases. In doing so, they
burden even the strongest patent assertions to address a problem with
the weakest patent assertions. Arguably, merits-related reforms, such as
the heightened pleading requirements and loser pays fee shifting of the
current patent reform proposals, are better situated to address concerns
with bottom feeder trolls. This is because these reforms more precisely
target weak claims, thus minimizing the spillover effects that reforms
have on stronger claims.
In any event, the exact same problems from high discovery costs
associated with bottom feeder trolls are also attributed to high discovery
costs in civil litigation generally. The primary concern with excessive
civil discovery is that “the time and expense defendants must devote to
responding to voluminous discovery requests will make settlement more
attractive” and the “risks of . . . litigation will produce unjustified
settlements.”145 The criticisms of plaintiffs’ lawyers in general civil
litigation, often made by those sympathetic to defense interests, echo
criticisms of bottom-feeder trolls in the patent context.146 For example,
143. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2126.
144. Id.
145. Beisner, supra note 67, at 594; John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE
L.J. 537, 538 (2010).
146. Plaintiffs’ lawyers from other fields have begun to represent patent assertion entities on a
contingency fee basis. Schwartz, supra note 91, at 363.
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plaintiffs’ lawyers are accused of “bring[ing] unmeritorious cases”
knowing that high litigation costs will force defendants to pay to settle
even the weakest claims.147 Likewise, critics suggest that “contingency
fees provide plaintiffs’ lawyers with a perverse incentive to file
speculative claims specifically to obtain quick settlements, either
‘nuisance settlements’ with small businesses who can little afford to pay
for a protracted legal fight, or ‘blackmail settlements’ with large
companies facing onerous and expensive litigation.”148 Plaintiffs’
lawyers are said to be “a drain on the American economy and a serious
threat to the livelihood and lifestyle of many Americans,”149 obtaining
huge fees with little to no benefit for the other ordinary people they
represent.150
Even if the discovery problems are the same in patent litigation and
other comparable civil litigation, they arguably pose greater risks in
patent litigation. Patent law is sometimes seen as having a special,
constitutionally enshrined role to promote innovation and fuel
America’s economy.151 Patent reform proponents make dramatic
claims about how high patent discovery costs “only serve[] as an
unhealthy tax on innovation and open competition” that costs American
workers jobs and American consumers new and improved products.152
However, those in specialized fields often believe “exceptionalist
approaches” are warranted without much normative support.153 That
seems to be the case here. The supposed needs of innovation now used
to justify special patent-only procedural rules that restrict enforcement

147. Koeltl, supra note 145, at 538.
148. Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (2005).
149. Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2007)
(quoting CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL LAWYERS, INC. 5 (2003))
(reviewing TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); WILLIAM HALTOM &
MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS
(2004); HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004)).
150. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 114 (2006) (describing
arguments about high attorneys’ fees and low benefits to the class members in class action
settlements).
151. See David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules
and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 473–80 (2013) (describing an argument for patent-special
legal rules because of a need “to encourage investment by rational market participants in
developing and disclosing new and useful inventions”).
152. Rader, supra note 8, at 337; see Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 3.
153. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1818. Those in specialized fields have an unsurprising
tendency to view their fields as particularly important and the needs of their fields as unique,
perhaps due to tunnel vision or a conscious or unconscious desire to bolster their own importance.
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of patent rights were used only a few years ago to justify special patentonly procedural rules that enhanced enforcement of patent rights.154
This inconsistency makes the supposed needs of innovation a
questionable basis on which to rest public policy.
Moreover, litigation costs are always deadweight losses resulting in
the inefficient use of resources that could be better spent on more
socially productive activities. There is no reason to think that resources
misdirected to patent litigation are any more harmful to American
businesses than resources misdirected to products liability, securities, or
other litigation. Civil litigation reformers use the same rhetoric of a
“litigation tax” on American business resulting from high discovery
costs that allegedly increases product prices, decreases wages, “hampers
productivity and innovation,” hinders international competitiveness, and
discourages investment in the United States.155
In sum, discovery in patent cases may be problematic. Its costs
certainly are high, and its effects—including its potential relationship to
the rise of patent assertion entities—may be significant. However, this
is not a patent problem but instead a civil litigation problem common to
so-called “mega cases”—complex, high stakes, and contentious cases.
In fact, the rise of patent assertion entities has made discovery in patent
cases look more like discovery in other civil litigation.
III. COMPARING THE CAUSES OF PATENT AND CIVIL DISCOVERY
PROBLEMS
As explained in Part II, the costs and consequences of discovery in
patent cases look surprisingly similar to other comparable civil cases,
i.e., complex, high stakes, and contentious cases. What about the causes
of costly and expansive discovery? If the costs and burdens of
discovery in patent cases exist for different reasons than in other
complex, high stakes cases, then “patent exceptionalist” discovery
reforms may be logical. Commentators point to two patent-specific
causes of costly discovery—the abusive practices of patent assertion
entities and the inherent technical complexity of patent cases. This Part
evaluates and questions the role of these patent-specific explanations in
causing costly and expansive patent discovery. It further suggests that
complex and open-ended remedial doctrines are more likely to be a
substantial contributor to the costs and burdens of discovery in patent
cases. Though these remedial doctrines themselves are unique to patent
154. See Taylor, supra note 151, at 473–80 (justifying pro-patent exceptionalist rules based on
needs of innovation).
155. Beisner, supra note 67, at 575–76.
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law, other areas of civil litigation have similar broad and open-ended
substantive doctrines that contribute to costly and expansive discovery.
A. Patent Assertion Entities and Discovery Problems
Patent assertion entities are blamed for most problems with the patent
system.156 Patent discovery is no exception. Two distinct claims are
made about the relationship between patent assertion entities and
discovery problems. First, as previously discussed, patent assertion
entities are said to exploit high discovery costs that asymmetrically fall
on defendants to extract cost-driven settlements, even for weak
claims.157 On this view, patent assertion entities are an effect of high
patent discovery costs (an effect that is probably better addressed
through merits-focused reforms, as discussed previously in Part II.B).
Second, patent assertion entities are described as a cause of high
discovery costs, with patent litigation brought by patent assertion
entities said to have higher per case discovery costs than that brought by
practicing patentees.158 Patent assertion entities purportedly have
unique “incentive[s] to apply ‘scorched earth’ techniques to force
defendants to spend an inordinate amount of time and energy colleting
and producing volumes of documents that are ultimately irrelevant to
the merits of the case.”159 The belief that patent assertion entities cause
higher discovery costs than practicing patentees is one of the driving
forces behind Congress’s patent-specific discovery reform proposals.160
Even if the causal story were true, patent litigation would seem to
mimic other comparable civil litigation in this regard. Plaintiffs’
lawyers in other areas of civil litigation purportedly “routinely burden
defendants with costly discovery requests and engage in open-ended
fishing expeditions.”161 More importantly, the notion that patent
assertion entities raise discovery and litigation costs compared to
practicing patentees is empirically flawed and theoretically
counterintuitive.

156. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2118–21.
157. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1.
158. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2161 (“[T]he idea that dealing with troll
patents is more costly than dealing with practicing entities seems to resonate with those facing
troll suits.”).
159. House Hearing, supra note 39, at 20.
160. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–33 (2013) (discussing witnesses’ accounts of the cost
and burden of discovery).
161. Beisner, supra note 67, at 549.
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1. Empirically, Discovery Costs are Lower in Patent Assertion Entity
Litigation
The best available empirical evidence demonstrates that discovery
costs are lower in cases brought by patent assertion entities. The
AIPLA 2013 survey for the first time distinguished costs in nonpracticing entity cases and, as shown in Table 1, costs through the end
of discovery were consistently lower regardless of the stakes.
TABLE 1: Patent Litigation Costs Through End of Discovery Based
on Type of Litigation162

Litigation
Type
All
NonPracticing
Entity

< $1 Million
at Risk
$350,000

$1–25 Million
at Risk
$1,400,000

> $25 Million
at Risk
$3,000,000

$300,000

$983,000

$2,500,000

Because the AIPLA’s survey does not distinguish between patentee
and accused infringer costs, it could obscure a different distribution of
costs in patent assertion entity cases, with accused infringers’ costs
higher than in cases brought by practicing patentees and patentees’ costs
significantly lower.163 However, the most comprehensive effort to
quantify the costs of patent assertion entities, a study by Professors
Bessen and Meurer, looked just at the costs to defendants in patent
assertion entity cases. To validate their findings, Bessen and Meurer
noted that the defendants’ direct legal costs in their survey were
generally less than the costs through the end of discovery for all patent
litigation in the AIPLA’s 2011 survey.164 Thus, the best empirical
evidence suggests that it is less costly to litigate against patent assertion
entities than practicing patentees.
No empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Arguments blaming high
discovery costs on patent assertion entities often note that there was a
dramatic rise in discovery costs—which doubled between 2001 and
2013165—over the same time period that patent assertion entities’ share
162. AIPLA, supra note 109, at 34–35.
163. Thanks to Mark Lemley for raising this possibility with me.
164. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 139, at 401–02 (making adjustments for likelihood of
settlement and noting some uncertainty as to whether the AIPLA survey is reporting means or
medians).
165. Compare AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -131 (showing median cost of patent
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of patent cases rose significantly. 166 Correlation is hardly evidence of
causation. In the same time period, the “exponential growth of and
reliance on electronic documents and communications” is popularly
believed to have increased discovery costs.167 Additionally, the hourly
billing rate of intellectual property lawyers was one and a half times
greater in 2013 than 2001,168 accounting for a significant part of the
increased discovery costs.
2. Theoretically, Discovery Costs Should Be Lower in Patent Assertion
Entity Litigation
The empirical evidence is hardly surprising. The relevant differences
between litigation brought by patent assertion entities and practicing
patentees should decrease, not increase, the burden and cost of
discovery in patent assertion entity cases. First, the stakes in litigation
brought by patent assertion entities tend to be lower than in litigation
brought by practicing patentees.169 Unsurprisingly, “higher monetary
stakes in the underlying litigation” are associated with higher litigation
and discovery costs.170 Thus, discovery costs should be lower in
comparatively lower stakes patent assertion entity litigation than in
comparatively higher stakes practicing patentee litigation.
Second, patent assertion entities are frequently represented by
contingent-fee lawyers, whereas practicing patentees are normally
litigation through end of discovery as $530,000 when less than $1 million at risk; $1,680,000
when $1–25 million at risk; and $3,571,000 when more than $25 million at risk), with AM.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001, at 84–85 (2001)
[hereinafter AIPLA 2001] (showing median cost of patent litigation through end of discovery as
$250,000 when less than $1 million at risk; $797,000 when $1–25 million at risk; and $1,508,000
when more than $25 million at risk).
166. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 140, at 5 (describing the rise of patent assertion entities over past decade).
167. FED. CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 42, at 2.
168. Compare AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-8, I-129 to -131 ($350), with AIPLA 2001, supra
note 165, at 37, 84–85 ($240).
169. See Mazzeo et al., supra note 141, at 897–98 (finding that damages awards are not
higher, and may be lower, in patent assertion entity cases than practicing patentee cases); Colleen
Chien, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara Univ., Patent Assertion Entities, PowerPoint Presentation
at FTC/DOJ Workshop on PAEs 69 (Dec. 10, 2012) (finding that 90% of patent assertion entity
cases have total costs—settlement or judgment plus legal fees—of less than $10 million); see also
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2140 (“[P]atent damages—at least as classically
understood—should be higher when practicing entities assert patents than when trolls do.”); id. at
2143 (“[P]racticing entities often have strategic interests that lead them to seek not only
injunctions, but also higher royalties or settlement payments than a troll would seek.”). But see
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 139, at 401 n.70 (claiming that “the stakes tend to be higher” in
patent assertion entity suits, though without providing support).
170. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 119, at 1 (litigation costs); see also Willging et al., supra
note 127, at 549–50 (discovery costs).
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represented by hourly fee lawyers.171 Hourly fee lawyers have
incentives to engage in “scorched earth” litigation tactics because it
maximizes their fees, while contingent-fee lawyers have incentives to
keep costs down to maximize their profits.172 As a result, higher
litigation costs are generally associated with billable hour, not
contingency, lawyers: “Plaintiff attorneys charging by the hour reported
costs almost 25% higher than those using other billing methods
(primarily contingency fee), all else equal.”173 Since broad and
aggressive discovery increases the compensation of the billable-hour
attorneys that normally represent practicing patentees and decreases the
compensation of contingent-fee attorneys that normally represent patent
assertion entities, discovery costs in patent assertion entity cases should
be lower than in practicing patentee cases.
Those blaming discovery problems on patent assertion entities
suggest that patent assertion entities can “propound extremely
burdensome discovery to corporate defendants without fearing that they
will be on the receiving end of corresponding burdens” because they do
not have their own products that would subject them to counterclaims
and because they have less complex business operations—and thus
fewer witnesses and far fewer documents—to produce in discovery.174
However, counterclaims for infringement against the patentee require a
significant investment of time and money, and “there is a dearth of
empirical evidence about how frequently counterclaims for patent
infringement arise in competitor litigation.”175 Moreover, patentees
generally have less discoverable information than accused infringers.176
It is not clear how much greater the asymmetry is with patent assertion
entities.
In any event, this argument overstates how easy it is to impose high
discovery costs simply by propounding broad discovery requests. The
171. Schwartz, supra note 91, at 356, 372, 374.
172. Id. at 361, 366.
173. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 119, at 6; see also Willging at al., supra note 127, at 541
(providing evidence suggestive of higher discovery costs for billable-hour lawyers as compared to
contingent-fee lawyers).
174. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31 (2013) (quoting witness testimony before a hearing of the
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet); Professors’ Letter, supra note
54, at 1.
175. David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 51, 53 n.8
(2014); see Jan M. Conlin & Marta M. Chou, Case Strategies to Succeed in the Changing World
of Patent Litigation, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES: LEADING
LAWYERS ON ADAPTING TO NEW TRENDS, IMPROVING COURTROOM TACTICS, AND
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF RECENT DECISIONS 17 (2010) (explaining the extensive prefiling steps that must be taken by a party making a patent assertion, including as a counterclaim).
176. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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two most costly aspects of discovery for responding parties are
depositions and document production. Depositions clearly require a
significant expenditure by the propounding party, who must prepare and
appear for the deposition, pay for the deposition space and court
reporter, and normally travel to the location of the witness. Less
obviously, obtaining document production from the defendant in
modern litigation also requires a significant investment by the
requesting party. “Under the current Rules, parties and their counsel are
motivated to treat discovery requests and responses as merely their first
offers in what will often be a protracted series of bargaining
sessions.”177 The typical response to broad document requests is
boilerplate objections and evasive and incomplete answers. The result
is “an iterative, multi-step ordeal, in which responses are followed by
conferences, then amended responses, then further conferences, and so
on. All of this haggling and negotiation over what should largely be
well-settled matters . . . drives up costs” for the requesting party, not
just the responding party.178 Thus, in practice, patent assertion entities
can propound broad discovery requests but cannot impose significant
costs and burdens on defendants without incurring significant costs
themselves. As a result, their attorneys’ contingent-fee structure will
discipline their ability to impose costs and burdens on defendants, even
if the threat of receiving reciprocally costly and burdensome discovery
requests does not.
B. Technical Complexity and Discovery Problems
Aside from patent assertion entities, the most commonly blamed
cause for the costs and burdens of discovery in patent cases is “[t]he
complexity inherent in patents.”179 The Government Accountability
Office endorsed this view, suggesting that “the technical complexity of
patent cases leads to expansive discovery requests that are time
consuming and expensive.”180 Likewise, Congress pointed to patent
litigation’s “technical nature and complexity” to justify patent-specific
discovery reform.181

177. Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal for Three
Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 476 (2010).
178. Id. at 477.
179. Varndell & Varndell, supra note 37, at 224; see also 6 PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.46[12][f] (3d ed. 2015), LEXIS (blaming expensive discovery
in patent litigation on “the complexity of the technical issues that attend patent infringement and
invalidity claims”).
180. GAO, supra note 115, at 37.
181. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 19 (2013).
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Two distinct types of activities are sometimes labeled “discovery” in
patent litigation. First, during fact discovery, the parties exchange
relevant information about historical events related to the litigation—for
example, the conception of the invention or the development of the
product accused of infringing. Second, during expert “discovery,” the
parties exchange reports from, and conduct depositions of, expert
witnesses. “Experts play a critical role in patent litigation,”182 in
significant part because of patent litigation’s inherent technical
complexity. Thus, technical complexity undoubtedly increases total
litigation costs in patent cases, in part because of the increased need and
importance of expert witnesses in patent litigation as compared to other
cases.183 However, current patent reform efforts are motivated by the
costs and burdens of fact discovery in patent cases and propose
discovery reforms focused on fact discovery. After a brief background
on patent litigation for unfamiliar readers, the following sections
suggest that technical complexity is not a particularly persuasive
explanation for costly and expansive fact discovery in patent cases
because the primary technical issues are surprisingly not discoveryintensive.
1. Patent Discovery in Context
Five major issues arise in most patent cases: claim construction,
infringement, invalidity, damages, and willfulness.184 The first three
issues constitute the technical side of patent litigation. Claim
construction is the interpretation of the claims at the end of the patent
that define the legal rights.185 A patent is infringed if the product at
issue (“accused product”) falls within the scope of the properly
interpreted patent claim.186 A patent is invalid if it fails to satisfy the
statutory requirements for a patent.187
The remaining two major issues—damages and willfulness—

182. ETHAN HORWITZ & LISA HERSHMAN, PATENT LITIGATION: CLIENT HANDBOOK
§ 6.01[1] (2012).
183. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449,
455 (2010) (noting that “[a]ll [patent] litigation steps are factually intensive and generally
exorbitantly expensive,” because, among other reasons, the lawyers need experts in the relevant
fields to explain the technology at issue to them, and subsequently to the judges and jurors).
Additionally, as a result of technical complexity, case investigation and evaluation probably
require more time and effort, and trials are probably longer and more complicated.
184. Norman Beamer, The Basics of an Effective Patent Strategy, in PATENT LITIGATION AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 7, 9.
185. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373–74 (1996).
186. Id. at 374.
187. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012).
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constitute the remedial part of patent litigation. A successful patentee is
entitled to compensatory damages for infringement in the form of lost
profits or a reasonable royalty.188 The primary result of a finding of
willful infringement is an award of enhanced damages—up to triple
compensatory damages—and attorneys’ fees.189 Infringement is willful
if “the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” (objective prong) and
this “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to
the accused infringer” (subjective prong).190 Recent developments have
made willful infringement harder to prove, but the patentee still “usually
claims that the accused infringer willfully infringed.”191
Aside from these major issues, the most common secondary issue in
patent litigation is inequitable conduct: whether the patent is
unenforceable due to misconduct by the patent holder before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”).192 Pleading and
substantive standards for inequitable conduct have been tightened in
recent years, and the defense is now raised in less than 20% of patent
cases.193 Patent defendants occasionally raise issues related to the
inventorship or ownership of the patent.194 Defendants also sometimes
claim patent misuse or antitrust violations.195 Finally, additional issues
arise when the patent holder and the accused infringer had a prior
relationship, such as whether a contract between the parties was
breached or whether the patentee is estopped based on its prior
representations.196
These secondary issues can be fact-intensive, involving the
development of the invention, the acquisition of the patent, and the
relationship of the parties. However, they are unlikely to significantly
contribute to the discovery problems motivating patent reform. Not
only are they less common, but the patentee tends to possess the bulk of
information relevant to these issues. By contrast, patent reform is

188. 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (1997).
189. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285; Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and
Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 419 (2012).
190. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
191. William L. LaFuze et al., Willful Infringement, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES
HANDBOOK 1153, 1154 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 3d ed. 2010).
192. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.09[1][a].
193. Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable Conduct, 3
IP THEORY 98, 106–08 (2013).
194. 8 CHISUM, supra note 188, § 22.02.
195. Tom Filarski & Heather N. Shafer, Patent Defenses, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES
HANDBOOK, supra note 191, at 1223, 1287–301.
196. Id. at 1302, 1305–13.
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motivated by situations in which the accused infringer asymmetrically
possesses the bulk of the information.197
2. Claim Construction and Infringement
Claim construction is at best a trivial part of fact discovery in patent
cases. The parties’ subjective understandings of the claim are irrelevant
to claim construction, which focuses on the patent itself and the publicly
available history of the Patent Office proceedings. 198 So-called
“extrinsic evidence” of general meaning in the technical field may also
be relevant but is disfavored by courts and rarely used by parties.199
Even when extrinsic evidence is used, it is normally dictionary
definitions, prior publications or patents in the field, and expert
declarations identified and exchanged by lawyers in litigation,200 not
evidence obtained from the parties during discovery.
Infringement depends strictly on a comparison of the accused product
to the requirements of the patent claim and does not require knowledge,
intent, motivation, or any other factual information about “who did what
and when.”201
Discovery on infringement generally requires a
straightforward production of information on the technical
characteristics of the accused product, i.e., what features it has and how
it works.202 This typically requires three sources of factual information:
(1) samples of the actual product; (2) a handful of technical documents
that explain the structure and operation of the accused product, such as
manuals, schematics, software code, or applications to the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) for drug approval; and (3) a deposition of
one or more scientists or engineers familiar with the structure and

197. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1.
198. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
199. John P. Fry, Helping Clients Navigate the Unfamiliar Waters of Patent Litigation, in
PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 39, 51.
200. N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 4-2(b).
201. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 188, § 16.02[2] (“One making, using or selling matter covered
by a patent without authority of the owner infringes regardless of knowledge or intent . . . .”); F.
SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 819–20 (5th ed.
2011) (summarizing requirements for infringement); Richard A. Cederoth, Preparing for Patent
Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 101, 104
(“[P]atent infringement litigation is also unique in that it is not necessary to prove intent to bring
a claim. . . . Therefore, these cases are often based not so much on who did what and when.”).
202. Fry, supra note 199, at 48; Edward H. Rice, A Strategic Approach to Patent Litigation, in
PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 19, 25. Patentees often phrase
their requests as “all” technical documents, but courts and litigants recognize that they are limited
to documents “sufficient to show” the technical characteristics. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 3-4(a)
(requiring an accused infringer to produce “documentation sufficient to show the operation of any
aspects or elements of an Accused Instrumentality”).
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operation of the accused product.203 In-house counsel for high-tech
companies suggest that in most cases the plaintiff’s entire infringement
case can be built from one response to a discovery request, namely, the
request for source code.204 Similarly, in the pharmaceutical industry,
infringement often can be determined entirely from the materials
submitted to the FDA.205
Fact-intensive issues of who did what, when, and where can arise
from the additional requirement for infringement that the accused
product be made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported in the United
States during the term of the patent.206 However, accused infringers
rarely dispute, and often stipulate to committing the relevant acts in the
United States during the patent term.207 Fact-intensive questions also
arise if the claim is not that the defendant directly infringed the patent,
but rather encouraged others to infringe (“inducement”) or supplied a
key component necessary to infringe (“contributory infringement”),
both of which have knowledge or intent requirements.208 Still, direct
infringement claims are the norm and indirect infringement claims are
comparatively less common.209
3. Invalidity
There are three major types of invalidity defenses: (1) failure to claim
patentable subject matter; (2) failure to adequately disclose the
invention; and (3) failure to adequately advance over the prior art.210
Because patentable subject matter focuses just on the patent itself and
the precedent interpreting the PATENT Act, it does not require
discovery and can be resolved on the pleadings.211 Like claim
203. Beamer, supra note 184, at 9. Infringement discovery can involve highly sensitive
technical information. Id. at 15. In modern litigation, most accused infringers willingly produce
even the most sensitive technical information under an appropriate protective order. Senate
Hearing, supra note 38, at 9.
204. Senate Hearing, supra note 38, at 9; see also House Hearing, supra note 39, at 32
(statement of Kevin T. Kramer, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel Intellectual Property,
Yahoo! Inc.).
205. Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 764 F.3d 1401, 1408–09 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
206. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
207. Cf. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(identifying two steps in infringement analysis are determining meaning of claims and comparing
claims to accused product), abrogated by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
208. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c); 5 CHISUM, supra note 188, §§ 17.03[2], 17.04[2].
209. Bernard Chao, Reconciling Foreign and Domestic Infringement, 80 UMKC L. REV. 607,
610 (2012).
210. These defenses are based on 35 U.S.C. § 101, § 112, and §§ 102–103, respectively.
211. See, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming
grant of motion for judgment on pleadings because patent was invalid for lack of patentable
subject matter).
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construction, the disclosure defenses—inadequate written description of
the invention, failure to enable a skilled person to make and use the
invention, and indefinite patent claims—focus on the patent document
and perhaps background information on the knowledge and
understanding of a skilled person in the field. This latter information
does not normally depend on the parties’ subjective knowledge or
materials within their possession and instead is developed through
expert testimony or treatises, textbooks, and articles, among other
resources, identified by the lawyers during litigation.212
Like infringement, the prior art defenses do not depend on the
inventor knowing about the prior art references, deriving its invention
from them, or intending to copy the prior art.213 Rather, the patent
claims are compared to the prior art to determine whether all elements
of the claim are found in a single reference (“anticipation”) or are found
in multiple references and a skilled person in the field would have
reason to combine those references (“obviousness”).214 This normally
requires just the prior art itself (prior patents, articles, or products) and
one or more depositions of engineers, scientists, or other technical
employees familiar with the field, as well as perhaps background
technical information from expert testimony, treatises, texts, and the
like identified by lawyers.215 While prior art is often identified through
expert witnesses or third-party prior art search firms, the parties’
document requests inevitably will ask for any potentially invalidating
patents, articles, or products in the other party’s possession. However,
the scope of these requests is fairly limited, as the prior art must predate the filing of the patent and either have the same features or be in
the same or an allied field as the patented invention.216
Invalidity can be more fact intensive in some circumstances.
Sometimes the alleged prior art is not a previous patent or published
scientific article but rather the claimed invention was previously in
public use, on sale, or otherwise known to the public.217 Proving that
212. See Filarski & Shafer, supra note 195, at 1252–61, 1268–80.
213. Beamer, supra note 184, at 10.
214. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.04[1]–[5]; Filarski & Shafer, supra note
195, at 1268–80.
215. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, §§ 2.03[2][e], 2.04[4].
216. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (limiting prior to what existed “before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention”). For obviousness, “prior art includes both references in the art in
question and references in such allied fields as a person with ordinary skill in the art would be
expected to examine for a solution to the problem.” 2 CHISUM, supra note 188, § 5.03[1]. This
limitation does not apply for anticipation but anticipation requires that the prior art have the exact
same features. Id. § 5.03[1][a][vi].
217. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b).
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the invention was used publicly, on sale, or known may require oral
testimony from knowledgeable fact witnesses, review of advertisements
and other marketing materials, detailed consideration of sales
negotiations, among other options.218 However, most prior art defenses
are based on printed publications, not prior use or sale of actual
products.219 Also, a prima facie case of obviousness can be rebutted by
so-called “secondary considerations,” such as commercial success, long
felt but unresolved need, and skepticism by others in the field that the
invention would work.220 Factual evidence, not just expert testimony,
often will be used to establish the secondary considerations.221 But
secondary considerations of nonobviousness play a fairly minor role in
patent litigation.222
4. Technical Issues and Patent Discovery Problems
In general, issues that are discovery intensive tend to involve openended inquiries;223 implicate a large number of people, or
“custodians”;224 require evidence in the form of emails or other
electronic communications; depend on intent, motive, or another
subjective state of mind; and have the potential for “smoking gun”
evidence that warrants a comprehensive investigation.225 These
characteristics are the exact opposite of the characteristics of an
ordinary infringement or invalidity analysis.
Infringement and
invalidity are both objective inquiries of limited scope: is each
limitation of the patent claim found in the accused product (for

218. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.03[3]–[4].
219. Frequently Asked Questions About Prior Art Searches, PRIORARTSEARCH.COM,
http://www.priorartsearch.com/faq.htm (last updated June 30, 2015).
220. MOORE ET AL., supra note 36, at 548–49.
221. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.04[6][a].
222. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1422 (2006) (“This study
reveals that secondary consideration evidence is rarely relevant to the non-obvious analysis in
reported decisions.”).
223. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982) (noting that judicial inquiry into
subjective intent and subjective motivation often “entail broad-ranging discovery and the
deposing of numerous persons”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
635, 640–41 (1989) (describing open-ended, multi-factor legal inquiries as creating greatest
discovery burden).
224. Rader, supra note 8, at 336–38 (pointing to e-mails and large number of custodians as
raising discovery costs).
225. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 (discussing judicial inquiry into subjective intent resulting in
broad-ranging discovery); Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 53–54
(1997) (suggesting that products liability should “make the manufacturer’s subjective state of
mind irrelevant” to “reduce the cost of discovery” because there would be “no point in searching
through storehouses of documents looking for the proverbial smoking gun”).
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infringement), prior art (for anticipation and obviousness), or patent
specification (for disclosure defenses)? They require only the construed
patent claims and a complete description of the accused product
(infringement), prior art (anticipation and obviousness), or invention
(disclosure defenses), at least in routine cases. Subjective knowledge,
intent, and motive are irrelevant to both infringement and invalidity. As
a result, there is no potential for smoking guns that would warrant
expansive or comprehensive discovery. Nor does either doctrine
normally depend on historical conception, design, development, or
manufacturing of the accused product or prior art, nor any other
question of who did what or when.226
Beyond just the limited breadth, technical documents are
comparatively readily available and easy to produce. Technical
documents relating to the accused product or the prior art are rarely in
the form of email or electronic communications, which are the most
costly to search for and produce.227 To the contrary, they are often
standardized documents (schematics, blueprints, users’ manuals,
product and scientific research, etc.) kept together and organized by
product in a standard way. Thus, only a limited number of people at a
company (“custodians,” in discovery terms) are necessary to find
technical documentation showing the features and operation of the
accused product or scientific and product research that may contain
prior art. The technical information will often be the same as what must
be submitted or kept to comply with regulatory requirements imposed
by the FDA, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”),
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), or other regulatory
bodies.228
Thus, the technical information necessary to prove
infringement is normally easily collected and produced at little cost or
burden.
Notably, under the patent local rules adopted by one-third of federal
district courts, defendants must produce “[s]ource code, specifications,
schematics, flow charts, artwork, formulas, or other documentation

226. See Cederoth, supra note 201, at 104 (“[P]atent infringement litigation is also unique in
that it is not necessary to prove intent to bring a claim. . . . Therefore, these cases are often based
not so much on who did what and when.”).
227. See House Hearing, supra note 39, at 32 (statement of Kevin T. Kramer, Vice President
and Deputy General Counsel Intellectual Property, Yahoo! Inc.) (“[E-]mails and their attachments
do not typically describe how our products perform or why.”).
228. See, e.g., Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 764 F.3d 1401, 1408–09 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(FDA submissions); Jeffrey I.D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit
Infringement Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 5, 34 (2002) (regulatory filings, particularly with the FDA or EPA).

REILLY (179-245).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

216

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/9/2015 5:15 PM

[Vol. 47

sufficient to show the operation of any aspects or elements of an
Accused Instrumentality” and “[a] copy or sample of the prior art” they
rely upon at the very beginning of the case, normally within two months
of the initial case management conference.229 These local rules were
drafted with input from a cross-section of the patent community,
representing both patentee and defense interests, and have been widely
praised.230 The quick production of technical documents and prior art
required by these widely accepted patent local rules casts further doubt
on the role of technical complexity in creating costly and expansive
discovery problems in patent litigation.
Of course, in some cases, technical complexity or technical issues
may generate high discovery costs. This will most commonly occur
when the nature of the defendant’s invalidity defense requires extensive
information about development and commercialization of either the
accused product or the patentee’s own product, such as a claim that the
patent is invalid based on prior use or sale of the invention. The
preceding discussion does not deny that technical complexity or
technical issues can contribute to high discovery costs or that in some
cases they may be the prime contributor to high discovery costs.
Rather, the analysis suggests that inherent technical complexity is not
the primary cause of costly and expansive patent discovery, as is often
suggested. Cases where high discovery costs are driven by technical
issues are likely to be exceptions, rather than the norm.
229. Compare Infringement Production (D), LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES MADE
EASY, http://www.localpatentrules.com/compare-rules/infringement-production-d/ (last visited
Sept. 13, 2015), with Invalidity Production (D), LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES MADE
EASY, http://www.localpatentrules.com/compare-rules/invalidity-production-d/ (last visited Sept.
13, 2015) (showing that most patent local rules require defendant to produce “documentation
sufficient to show the operation of any aspects or elements of an Accused Instrumentality” and a
copy of prior art with invalidity contentions); compare Summary Charts: Infringement
Contentions, LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES MADE EASY, http://www.localpatentrules.
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Chart%20Infringement%20Contentions.pdf (last visited Sept.
13, 2015), with Summary Charts: Invalidity Contentions, LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES
MADE EASY, http://www.localpatentrules.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Chart%20Invalidity
%20Contentions.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (showing that most patent local rules require
infringement contentions to be served within fourteen to sixty days of case management
conference and invalidity contentions to be served within thirty to sixty days of infringement
contentions).
230. See, e.g., Matthew F. Kennelly & Edward D. Manzo, Northern District of Illinois Adopts
Local Patent Rules, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 202, 203–05 (2009) (describing
support for patent local rules among local bar and clients and drafting by those who typically
represent defendants, those who typically represent plaintiffs, and those who represent both);
James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the Northern
District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
965, 1007–14 (2009) (describing how patent local rules have been “broadly applauded” and
widely adopted).
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C. Remedial Complexity and Discovery Problems
The prior sections have questioned the most common explanations
for the high costs and burdens of discovery in patent cases: abusive
tactics of patent assertion entities and technical complexity. What, then,
drives the costs and burdens of patent discovery? A major contributor,
and perhaps the major contributor, has been largely overlooked in patent
reform debates and, yet, is readily apparent from careful analysis of the
issues in patent litigation: the remedial doctrines of damages (lost
profits or reasonable royalty) and willful infringement.
1. Damages
Both lost profits and reasonable royalty damages depend on an effort
to reconstruct the world as it would have been if the defendant had not
infringed to determine either how many of the defendant’s sales the
patentee would have made (lost profits) or the terms the parties would
have agreed on if they had negotiated a license instead (reasonable
royalty).231 Both necessarily require volumes of historical information
about the parties, the finances, the products, the sales, and so forth.232
The reasonable royalty inquiry is probably the most fact-intensive
issue in patent litigation.233 It “take[s] into account every economic
factor that the parties could have considered at the time of
infringement.”234 Courts almost always use the “Georgia-Pacific
factors,” which are a nonexclusive list of fifteen factors expressly
intended to cover “a broad spectrum of other evidentiary facts probative
of a ‘reasonable’ royalty.”235 They implicate virtually every aspect of a
defendant’s (and patentee’s) business, including technical design;
product development and strategy; manufacturing; pricing; sales;
distribution networks; customers; finance; marketing and advertising;
market, consumer, and competitive research; business and strategic
plans; sales and market forecasts; and licensing and legal.236 The

231. RICHARD F. CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE: A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO
ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER DAMAGE STRATEGIES 125–26 (2d ed. 2011).
232. Beamer, supra note 184, at 11; Barry L. Grossman, Patent Infringement Damages, in
PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK, supra note 191, at 1403, 1404.
233. See John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and
Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 775
(2013) (“[C]ourts have historically tended to afford litigants a substantial amount of flexibility
regarding both the type and quantum of evidence that may be used to support a reasonable royalty
damages determination.”)
234. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13.
235. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
236. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 65, 72–73, 89, 95, 98, 108–09, 122; Carolyn Blankenship &
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Georgia-Pacific factors even justify substantial discovery into sales,
marketing, financial, and technical documents related to products not
accused of infringement, both to determine if other products are sold or
used with the accused products and to highlight differences that can be
informative of the demand for and value of the patented features.237
Without exaggeration, the Georgia-Pacific factors justify discovery of
virtually any aspect of an accused infringer’s business.238
Beyond scope, reasonable royalty discovery also is broad in terms of
people, or “custodians.” Various people will have responsibility for the
wide-ranging aspects of the defendant’s business relevant to the
reasonable royalty. It is also broad in time, covering both before
infringement began and subsequent events that might shed light on the
pre-infringement negotiation.239 Finally, unlike infringement and
invalidity, e-mails and other electronic communications can be relevant
to the reasonable royalty. For example, e-mails may discuss or reflect
the importance and value attributed to the patented feature as compared
to other features, either internally or among distributors and
customers.240
Lost profits damages also require “substantial discovery.”241
Specifically, lost profits require the patent holder to show both its profit
margin and that “but for the infringer’s improper acts, [it] would have
made greater sales, charged higher prices or incurred lower
expenses.”242 Some of the lost profits discovery focuses exclusively on
the patentee, including the patentee’s manufacturing and marketing
capacity. However, lost profits necessitate discovery into the accused
infringer’s technical design; product development; customers; pricing;
sales; marketing; and consumer and market research.243 In fact, to
determine whether there are noninfringing alternatives, extensive
discovery may be necessary into the design, technical features,
development, marketing, sales, pricing, and customers of the accused
infringer’s non-accused products. All of this discovery implicates a
large number of custodians. Costly third-party discovery often also is
Laura Stamm, Proving Patent Damages, 15 IP LITIGATOR, No. 3, May/June 2009, at 1, 3–4.
237. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 73, 95; Blankenship & Stamm, supra note 236, at 3–4.
238. Cf. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 632 (2010) (“The multi-factor test makes
it difficult for the court to exercise a gate-keeping function, because a wide range of evidence can
be offered in support of one factor or another.”).
239. CHISUM, supra note 188, § 20.07[3][c].
240. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 102–03.
241. Id. at 134.
242. CHISUM, supra note 188, § 20.05.
243. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 134–35, 150–51.
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necessary to identify alternative noninfringing products in the market
and customer perceptions.244
2. Willfulness
Willfulness raises patent discovery costs in three key ways. 245 First,
it most directly introduces discovery-intensive subjective
considerations—like knowledge, intent, and motive—into patent
litigation.246 This requires extensive discovery into product research,
conception, design, and development to determine whether the accused
infringer deliberately copied the patentee’s product, had a motive to
harm the patentee, attempted to conceal the patent, or investigated the
patent.247 Second, the relevant knowledge for willfulness can come
from any of the accused infringer’s employees, not just those with
“decision-making capacity.”248 As a result, discovery on willfulness
implicates numerous “custodians”—virtually any of the accused
infringer’s employees. It also justifies comprehensive discovery to
potentially find a buried “smoking gun” demonstrating knowledge of
the patent.249 Third, willfulness is the primary justification for costly
and burdensome discovery of the accused infringer’s e-mails and other
electronic communications.250
3. Remedial Issues and Patent Discovery Problems
The remedial doctrines are historical inquiries that try to recreate the

244. Id. at 135.
245. In the past, willfulness introduced difficult and contentious questions about attorneyclient privilege, work product, and the waiver thereof. However, Federal Circuit decisions over
the past decade have mitigated, though not eliminated, these problems. See CHISUM, supra note
188, § 20.03[4][b][v][L][2] (describing how recent decisions have reduced the importance of an
advice of counsel defense and the attorney-client privilege issues that accompany it).
246. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“Because
patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant in
determining whether enhanced damages are warranted.”).
247. See Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing
factors to be considered in determining whether to enhance damages for willful infringement);
CHISUM, supra note 188, § 20.03[4][b][v][L][7] (same).
248. Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
249. Josephine Benkers, Examining Proposed Legislation to Reduce the Discovery Burden in
Patent Cases, INSIDE COUNSEL (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/04/02/
examining-proposed-legislation-to-reduce-the-disco.
250. Noemi C. Espinosa, Tactics to Limit E-Discovery Costs in Patent Cases, LAW360 (June
15, 2010, 10:34 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/171971/tactics-to-limit-e-discovery-costsin-patent-cases; see also Benkers, supra note 249 (“[A] plaintiff in a patent case—maybe a patent
troll—might ask for many thousands of emails, in search of some smoking-gun email mentioning
the patent-in-suit, which may be relevant to a question of willful infringement.”).
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world, the market, and the parties as they existed before infringement
began.251 Unlike infringement and invalidity, they are intimately
focused on who did what and when.252 Unlike infringement and
invalidity, the remedial doctrines are broad and open ended,
encouraging consideration of any evidence that could shed light on the
situation as it existed at the time infringement began.253 Not only do
the broad and open-ended remedial doctrines increase the scope of
discoverable information, but they also generate more opportunities for
the parties to propound broad discovery requests and to dispute whether
information or evidence covered by these broad requests is relevant,
necessary, or cost justified. The resulting discovery disputes impose
additional costs beyond just the costs of collection and production of
documents.
Unlike infringement and invalidity, remedial doctrines are inherently
subjective, focused on the parties’ knowledge, intent, and motives.254
Unlike infringement and invalidity, a wide array of custodians in a
company could have nonduplicative information relevant to the
remedial doctrines, this information could be in the form of electronic
communications, and comprehensive production is warranted by the
potential for smoking guns.255 These characteristics are exactly what
are normally associated with expansive and costly discovery. 256
No empirical evidence apportions discovery costs among the various
issues in patent litigation, but remedial complexity is a theoretically
much stronger explanation for the perceived high costs and burdens of
251. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (reasonable royalty); id. at 125–26 (lost profits); CHISUM,
supra note 188, § 20.03[4][b][v][F] (willfulness).
252. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348 (explaining that enhanced damages for willfulness
consider “whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another,” “investigated
the patent and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed,” and
“attempted to conceal its misconduct”); CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (noting that reasonable
royalty focuses on “what the parties themselves would have agreed to”); id. at 130 (stating that
lost profits considers actual market conditions and the actual competition between the parties).
253. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348 (applying a totality-of-circumstances approach to
willfulness and enhanced damages); CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (explaining that reasonable
royalty provides an “opportunity to bring virtually any economic factor the parties might have
considered to the table”); id. at 126 (“[T]he actual application of this [lost profits] remedy is
highly complex if done correctly.”).
254. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348 (noting that enhanced damages for willfulness considers,
inter alia, the defendant’s knowledge, good faith belief, motivation, and deliberate copying);
CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (stating that reasonable royalty “should reflect what the parties
themselves would have agreed to”).
255. Benkers, supra note 249 (“[A] plaintiff in a patent case . . . might ask for many thousands
of emails, in search of some smoking-gun email mentioning the patent-in-suit, which may be
relevant to a question of willful infringement.”).
256. See supra Part III.C.3.
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discovery in patent cases than those commonly identified and
motivating patent reform efforts, namely, patent assertion entities and
inherent technical complexity. Although technical issues can be
discovery intensive in some cases, discovery-intensive remedial issues
arise in virtually all cases.
Unlike patent assertion entities and inherent technical complexity—
which are, at least arguably, problems unique to patent litigation—
remedial complexity does not necessarily distinguish discovery in
patent cases from other comparable civil litigation. Of course, the
reasonable royalty, lost profits, and willfulness doctrines themselves are
patent-specific. But they are just specific iterations of a more general
phenomenon of complex and discovery-intensive doctrines also found
in other areas of complex civil litigation. For example, commentators
suggest “antitrust discovery is inevitably costly and protracted” because
under the “fact-intensive” rule-of-reason doctrine, “[t]here are few
things about the operation of a business that would not be relevant.”257
Similarly, the specific causation requirement in toxic tort cases can
require costly, time-intensive, and complicated discovery.258
IV. REFORMING PATENT AND CIVIL DISCOVERY
Patent discovery may not be representative of the median civil case—
the stakes and amount of discovery are significantly greater—but it is
representative of the more complex, higher stakes, and more costly end
of civil litigation in terms of discovery costs, effects, and causes. This
subset of “mega cases” is widely seen as having a pervasive problem of
excessive discovery that may warrant discovery reforms. 259
Reconceptualizing the discovery problems in patent cases as just one
example of a broader problem of discovery in mega cases has important
implications for both patent reform and general civil litigation reform.
For civil litigation reform, patent litigation offers a new data point to
analyze the discovery problems in mega cases and their potential
solutions.
For patent reform, it raises questions about the need and wisdom of
engaging in patent-only discovery reforms. What normative basis exists
257. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1375, 1461 n. 376, 1462 (2009) (quoting Conrad M. Shumadine & Michael R. Katchmark,
Antitrust and the Media, 917 P.L.I./PAT 393, 407 (2007)).
258. Rachel D. Guthrie, Muddying the Waters: The Downstream Implications of Wal-Mart v.
Dukes for Medical Monitoring Class Actions in Missouri, 7 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L.
305, 313, 339–40 (2013).
259. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78; Subrin & Main, supra
note 65, at 1850.
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for addressing the mega case discovery problem only in patent cases,
aside from the superior lobbying influence of patent constituencies like
Silicon Valley?260 Patent-only discovery reforms depart from the
“transsubstantive” norm that has dominated procedural rules for over a
century, i.e., procedural rules apply equally to all cases regardless of
substance.261 While many have questioned the continued wisdom of
transsubstantive procedural rules, significant departures have only
occurred in three areas—prisoners, securities, and medical
malpractice.262 If patent discovery is comparable to discovery in other
complex, high stakes civil cases, it is not clear why patent litigation
should be added to this list.263 Relatedly, viewing the patent discovery
problem as a subset of the larger mega case discovery problem suggests
the usefulness of looking to the general civil litigation reform debate for
both evaluation of proposed reforms and potential alternative reforms.
This Part turns to the question of reforming discovery in mega cases
like patent litigation, applying the lessons learned from the case study of
patent litigation in Parts II and III. Section A questions whether
procedural reform is even the proper means for reform, given the role of
broad substantive rights and doctrines in creating costly and
burdensome discovery. Section B turns to the specific reforms
proposed in both patent litigation and civil litigation generally, finding
them poorly tailored to address the problem exactly because they
assume the problem is one just of procedure, not substantive law.
Section C offers a more promising alternative that preserves substantive

260. See Fung, supra note 89 (describing patent reform supporters as “leading tech companies
that are often the target of patent trolls”).
261. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376, 389, 392 (2010).
262. Id. at 372–73, 404–09.
263. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2067, 2086 (1989) (suggesting “there are reasons for Congress to proceed cautiously” in
departing from trans-substantive procedural rules). That Congress is the primary institution
considering patent-specific discovery rules may mitigate concerns about the departure from the
trans-substantive norm, because Congress has the power to engage in substantive patent reform.
Marcus, supra note 261, at 416. On the other hand, procedural reform may be used as a
“backdoor vehicle” to achieve substantive reforms that would not survive the greater attention,
more direct consideration, and more organized opposition that would accompany actual
substantive law reform, such as an amendment to the PATENT Act that limits enforcement of
patents to patentees that practice their invention. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its
Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1872, 1877–78 (2006) (describing how procedural mechanisms are often used as a vehicle to
reform substantive law without actual substantive reform legislation); see also Subrin & Main,
supra note 65, at 1869 (describing procedural reform as “Plan B” when substantive reforms
failed).
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rights and doctrines while reducing discovery costs and burdens: staging
litigation to resolve potentially case-dispositive issues before any
discovery or other litigation occurs on more discovery-intensive issues.
A. A “Problem” of Substantive Law, Not Procedure?
A key driver of the costs and burdens of patent discovery is not the
parties, the procedures, or the facts (i.e., technical complexity), but
rather the law and, in particular, the remedial doctrines that make such a
wide swath of information relevant. This provides an important
reminder of the general contribution of substantive rights and doctrines
to high discovery and litigation costs. Some commentators have
recognized as much. For example, Professor Arthur Miller noted
several decades ago that recognition of new substantive rights and
expansion of substantive doctrines in the 1960s and 1970s, not the class
action procedure, was to blame “for the increased burdens associated
with new patterns of complex litigation.”264 Twenty-five years ago,
Judge Frank Easterbrook blamed the costs and burdens of discovery on
“[m]ulti-factor standards” that provide “no rule of decision but only an
injunction to consider everything that turns out to matter.”265 And
specific substantive doctrines have occasionally been blamed for high
discovery and litigation costs in specific substantive areas.266
Yet, this point has been drowned out by the loud crowd blaming
procedural rules and devices for high discovery and litigation costs.267
For example, civil litigation reformers see the problems as lying solely
with procedure, such as “the failure of procedural rules to adequately
limit the scope and amount of discovery permitted.”268 Similarly,
patent reformers focus on alleged “misuse of various patentenforcement mechanisms” and “patent-litigation abuses.”269 The role
of substantive rights and doctrines is ignored or glossed over in these
accounts. Perhaps this is unsurprising—reform proponents know that

264. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670–76 (1979).
265. Easterbrook, supra note 223, at 640–41, 643–44.
266. Stucke, supra note 257, at 1461–62 (rule of reason in antitrust).
267. Lee & Willging, supra note 35, at 782–83 (“Has the case for wide-ranging reform of the
discovery rules been made? The argument is being made insistently, for sure.”).
268. Beisner, supra note 67, at 551–52 (blaming, in addition, the lack of fee shifting,
adversarial system, malpractice law, and absence of judicial case management); see also
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-5 (noting that proponents blame
discovery problems on the fact “the proportionality factors currently found in Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) often are overlooked by courts and litigants” and relocating them “will help
achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”).
269. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 18–19 (2013).

REILLY (179-245).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

224

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/9/2015 5:15 PM

[Vol. 47

procedural reform is less visible and less likely to generate opposition
than substantive law reform.270 Reform opponents generally favor the
broad substantive rights and doctrines and therefore have little incentive
to connect high discovery and litigation costs to these rights and
doctrines.
The patent litigation case study provides concrete evidence of how
broad substantive law can, and does, generate high discovery and
litigation costs. What this means for reform is less clear. Perhaps the
broad substantive rights and doctrines serve important substantive
functions that we are unwilling to disturb. For example, in patent
litigation, the Georgia-Pacific factors are said to use sound economic
principles to provide a precise estimate of what constitutes a
“reasonable royalty” under the statute,271 while the willful infringement
doctrine can be theoretically justified as a deterrent that encourages ex
ante licensing.272 High discovery and litigation costs may be the
inevitable price necessary for achieving the objectives served by broad
substantive rights and doctrines.
On the other hand, perhaps the value of the broad substantive rights
and doctrines are not worth their costs.273 For example, the GeorgiaPacific factors have been derided for their openendedness, which
creates unpredictability and conflict, offers no practical guidance to a
jury, fails to discipline party or expert arguments, hinders judicial
oversight, and ultimately leads to imprecision and overcompensation.274
Likewise, the willful infringement doctrine is said to chill socially
desirable behavior, encourage overly generous settlements, or,
conversely, discourage settlement by increasing divergence in the
parties’ positions.275 Commentators propose reforming276 or even

270. Cf. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 88, at 1582 (“When the Court is engaged in
apparently procedural and legalistic decisionmaking, the public perceives it as more objective,
neutral, and legitimate. Indeed, the public is less likely to notice such decisions at all.” (footnote
omitted)).
271. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 12–13.
272. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (describing the
purpose of willfulness, in part, as “an economic deterrent to the tort of infringement”).
273. Easterbrook, supra note 223, at 643.
274. Durie & Lemley, supra note 238, at 631–32; Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 233, at 783;
Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 655, 665–67 (2009).
275. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV.
517, 568–69 (2014) (arguing that current willfulness doctrine “ill-advisedly eradicate[s] some
third-party activity that would otherwise serve a salutary purpose”). See generally Samuel Chase
Means, Note, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent Law’s Willful Infringement
Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999 (summarizing literature).
276. Durie & Lemley, supra note 238, at 643–44 (reasonable royalties); Means, supra note
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abandoning277 both doctrines, given their questionable value. However,
commentators largely overlook the discovery and litigation costs that
broad patent remedial doctrines impose.278 Appreciating the role of
remedial patent doctrines in generating high discovery and litigation
costs is crucial to an accurate determination of whether these doctrines
are cost justified or should be reformed or abandoned. More generally,
linking substantive rights and doctrines to high discovery and litigation
costs is vital to determining whether the expansion of legal rights and
doctrines in recent decades is warranted or has gone too far. This is a
debate for substantive legal reform, not procedural reform.
B. The Shortcomings of Current Reform Proposals
Turning to the present round of civil litigation and patent reforms, the
specific reforms proposed may not be optimal for combatting discovery
problems in patent litigation and other mega cases exactly because they
treat the problem as one exclusively of procedure and ignore the role of
broad modern substantive rights and doctrines.
The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set to go
into effect in December 2015 provide that discovery must be
“proportional to the needs of the case.”279 However, among the factors
considered in determining whether discovery is proportional is “the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”280 The broader the
substantive rights and doctrines involved in a case, the broader the
scope of discovery that will be important to resolving the issues. Put
another way, if broad modern substantive rights and doctrines are a
significant contributor to high discovery and litigation costs, then a
proportionality requirement is a questionable means for reducing
discovery and litigation costs because broad discovery will be
proportional to broad substantive rights and doctrines.
Analysis of the proposed patent-only discovery reforms is more
complicated. The most significant patent discovery reform would
require the requesting party to pay for production of so-called “non275, at 2022–35 (summarizing literature on willful infringement).
277. Sichelman, supra note 275, at 567 (proposing damages approach that would focus
directly on innovation incentives); Means, supra note 275, at 2022–35 (summarizing literature on
willful infringement).
278. Commentators sometimes point to the additional complication and costs the willfulness
doctrine imposes on trials. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent
Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 235 (2004) (“[B]ifurcating [trials] actually saves money and
time—in short, it is more efficient.”). However, the discovery costs generated by the doctrine are
likely to be far more significant, since so few cases go to trial.
279. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-30.
280. Id.
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core” documents, and the assumption seems to be that most of the
information required to establish damages under existing doctrines
would constitute non-core documents.281
Indirectly, or perhaps
inadvertently, this provision targets patent discovery reform at the right
problem, broad remedial doctrines. But it does so for the wrong reason,
apparently under the belief that this remedial discovery is not necessary
and is sought solely for harassment purposes. For example, one witness
testified at a hearing before the House of Representatives:
In a patent case, very few documents are relevant to the core issues in
the case. Such documents are ones that bear on the patentee’s
ownership, any prior art known to either party, and technical
documents sufficient to show how the accused features work at the
level of detail addressed by the claims. Documents beyond this tend
to be both irrelevant and expensive to produce.282

While remedial discovery may be “expensive to produce,” it is
certainly not “irrelevant.” To the contrary, it is necessary to prove
damages and willful infringement under the governing doctrines
adopted by the PATENT Act and the Federal Circuit. Although
motivated by patent assertion entities’ purported use of high discovery
costs to extort settlements even for nonmeritorious claims, the “core”
and “non-core” discovery provisions extends more broadly to require all
requesting parties to pay for the non-core documents.
As a
consequence, even the patentees with the most meritorious claims will
have to pay for discovery that is relevant and necessary to crucial
elements of their patent infringement claims. This represents a
fundamental departure from the American discovery system that has
existed since 1938.283 There is also a risk that the increased costs will
screen out meritorious patent claims along with nonmeritorious claims
and deny effective access to courts to enforce valid and infringed patent
rights.284
The other major discovery reform proposed—staying almost all
discovery until after the court issues its claim construction order—was
more promising. In effect, it would delay most discovery until nearly a
year into the case, including the costly and expansive remedial
281. See supra Part II.A.
282. House Hearing, supra note 39, at 21.
283. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 63, at 774 (“[S]ince the adoption of the Federal
Rules in 1938, the allocation of discovery costs has been governed by the presumption that the
party from whom the information is sought—the producing party—must bear the expenses
associated with the fulfillment of its opponent’s discovery requests.”).
284. Cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal
Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1732 (2013) (raising similar concerns with heightened
pleading requirements for civil litigation generally).
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discovery. More importantly, it would require an initial determination
on merits issues—the meaning and scope of the patent claims—before
permitting the expensive and burdensome discovery on remedial issues.
Although claim construction does not directly resolve liability issues, it
substantially influences the outcome of infringement and invalidity
issues and can be effectively case dispositive.285 Delaying most
discovery until after claim construction would save significant
discovery costs in those cases where claim construction proves
effectively case-dispositive. And, significantly, it would save costly
and expansive discovery for cases that had at least some merit, i.e.,
enough merit to remain viable after the meaning and the scope of the
patent claims are determined. In this way, the stay of discovery pending
claim construction was an attractive reform that bears significant
resemblance to the reforms proposed in the next section. Unfortunately,
it was abandoned in both the House and Senate reforms.
On the other hand, the proposed claim construction stay might not
have been optimal, both because it was too broad and too narrow. The
stay was too broad because it included technical discovery within the
stay. However, technical discovery is relatively limited, cheap, and
easily produced at early stages in the case.286 The limited costs of
allowing pre-claim construction technical discovery are likely
outweighed by the potential benefits, including providing context that
sharpens and narrows claim construction disputes287 and allowing the
case to proceed expeditiously after claim construction. The discovery
stay was too narrow because it would only delay expensive and
burdensome remedial discovery until after claim construction. Delaying
remedial discovery until after liability (infringement and noninvalidity)
is established would offer greater cost savings without any significant
downside, as explained below.288
C. A More Promising Alternative: Staging Litigation
The prior sections lead to an important question: is it possible to
reduce the high costs and burdens of discovery, at least in mega cases,
while preserving broad modern substantive rights and doctrines and not
denying or hindering access to courts for meritorious claims? The case
study of patent litigation in Parts II and III suggests that the answer can
285. See supra Part I.A.
286. See supra Part III.C.
287. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (noting that “information about the accused products” provides “context for accurate
claim construction”).
288. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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be yes. The liability issues of infringement and invalidity are not
particularly discovery-intensive and the remedial doctrines of damages
and willful infringement are largely to blame for the high costs and
burdens of patent discovery. This apportionment of discovery costs
suggests a useful means for preserving substantive rights and doctrines,
reducing costs, and targeting cost reductions at the least meritorious
claims: delaying discovery (and other litigation activities) on remedial
issues until after liability is established. This type of staging289 of
litigation could be beneficial beyond patent cases. Other areas of law,
particularly those that produce mega cases, may also have potentially
dispositive issues that can be separated from discovery-intensive issues
and resolved first, thereby eliminating the most intensive discovery in
some cases and limiting it to the more meritorious cases.290
The following subsections sketch the argument for staged litigation,
describing its potential benefits and the traces of staged litigation that
already exist in civil litigation; its application to patent litigation; its
potential application in civil litigation more generally; and potential
counterarguments and obstacles to implementing staged litigation. The
purpose is to identify staged litigation’s promise in addressing discovery
problems in patent litigation and other mega cases, not to conclusively
determine that staged litigation is the only means for addressing
discovery problems or even the optimal way of doing so.
1. The Case for Staged Litigation
Staged litigation, as used herein, is conceptually straightforward:
certain potentially case-dispositive issues are separated and litigated
first, with discovery and resolution (by summary judgment, trial, or

289. I prefer the term “staging” to “bifurcating” because bifurcating suggests two phases when
more may be optimal and bifurcating is already associated with phased trials, whereas staged
litigation phases the entire case, including discovery.
290. See, e.g., Janet L. McDavid, Using Alternative Dispute Resolution in Antitrust Cases, 4
ANTITRUST 25, 27 (1990) (noting that in antitrust cases “[d]iscovery could be limited to particular
issues (e.g., market definition and market power, existence of conspiracy, causation)” and those
issues are resolved before the remainder of discovery occurs); Don Zupanec, Bifurcating
Discovery—Summary Judgment Motion, 25 FED. LITIGATOR 1, 12 (2010) (describing staged
litigation between liability and damages in bankruptcy core proceedings context); Cassandra
Feeney, Note, Are You “In Good Hands”?: Balancing Protection for Insurers and Insured in
First-Party Bad-Faith Claims with a Uniform Standard, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 685, 699–701
(2011) (discussing staying insurance litigation on bad-faith issue until breach of contract issue is
resolved); see also, e.g., Harris v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 261 F.R.D. 98, 111 (D.S.C. 2009)
(ordering discovery and resolution of class certification issues to occur before discovery and
resolution of merits issues); Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d
273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (staging litigation to limit discovery to whether plaintiff suffered
compensable injury until that issue was resolved).
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other means) on those issues occurring before any discovery, resolution,
or other litigation activities occur on other issues. Preferably, the most
discovery-intensive issues would be saved for the latter stages of
litigation, so that the most costly and burdensome discovery only occurs
once the plaintiff’s claim has been found meritorious on the initial
issues.
Staged litigation has significant potential benefits. Staging litigation
can reduce the total (cumulative) costs of discovery by eliminating the
most expensive and burdensome discovery in cases that are resolved in
favor of the defendant during the first, potentially case-dispositive,
stage. Staged litigation also would improve the distribution of
discovery costs by apportioning the most expensive and most
burdensome discovery to the more meritorious cases, i.e., those where
the plaintiff has prevailed in the early stage issues. By reducing and
better apportioning discovery costs, staged litigation reduces
defendants’ incentives to settle even meritorious claims and,
consequently, reduces plaintiffs’ incentives to bring weak claims in the
hope of obtaining cost-of-defense settlements.291 Instead, defendants
can make a smaller investment in the first stage of discovery in order to
get a merits resolution on at least one potentially case-dispositive issue.

291. In the leading article on bifurcated trials, Professor William Landes agrees that
bifurcation reduces per-case litigation costs but argues that this will not necessarily reduce the
aggregate costs of litigation because the lower per-case litigation costs will encourage more
plaintiffs to sue and will discourage settlements. William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary
Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100–01 (1993). Even assuming this
analysis would hold true for staged litigation, staged litigation may still be optimal. To the extent
the encouraged plaintiffs have meritorious claims, the increased viability of suit from decreased
per-case costs is socially desirable, since procedure seeks to faithfully implement substantive law
in the most efficient way, not simply reduce costs. See Nagareda, supra note 263, at 1874–78
(judging procedural mechanisms based on whether they would further or interfere with the
underlying remedial scheme). Similarly, a major concern in patent litigation and other mega
cases is that litigation costs are encouraging too many settlements, especially settlements of
nonmeritorious claims. Moreover, Professor Landes makes two assumptions that do not appear
to hold in mega cases. First, Professor Landes “eliminates the possibility of suits that have a
negative expected value to the plaintiff but are brought to extract a settlement.” Landes, supra, at
102 n.8. Second, he assumes that the parties and different phases all have equal costs. Drury
Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 233 (2006). While the second
assumption may be logical for trial—where each side must put on fairly equal cases—it does not
hold for discovery in both patent litigation (since the rise of patent assertion entities) and other
mega cases (where the prototypical case is individual plaintiffs with limited information suing a
corporate defendant with infinite information). In these cases, discovery costs will often be
imbalanced in favor of the plaintiff. Indeed, this is exactly the reason that cost-of-defense
settlement cases can be brought in these areas. Thus, the benefit of the reduction in per-case costs
in patent litigation and other mega cases will often benefit the defendant more than the plaintiff.
Presumably, this will reduce the plaintiff’s incentives to file suit, especially for nonmeritorious
cases where the primary goal is a settlement based on the defendant’s high litigation costs.
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This makes it more likely that settlements will reflect the merits of the
claim, not the costs of litigation.
Importantly, however, staged litigation reduces costs and improves
the distribution of costs while still preserving other values deemed
important to American litigation, like access to courts, information, and
jury trials.292 The plaintiff is still entitled to discover all the information
necessary to prove the merits of its claim and to have its claim
adjudicated by a jury of its peers (if appropriate). However, the
discovery and jury trials occur in phases as the plaintiff establishes the
merits of its claims on some issues, rather than all at once as in unitary
litigation.
Although this description of staged litigation bears resemblance to
the “more sequential process for developing evidence” that
characterizes many civil law or continental legal systems,293 staged
litigation lurks on the fringes of American litigation. It occurs
occasionally in American courts but only in a sporadic, case-by-case,
and unprincipled way.294 Although practitioners, scholars, and policy
makers have discussed at length splitting trials into different phases,295
they have largely overlooked the possibility of staging litigation in its
entirety, such that discovery, resolution, and other litigation activities
occur completely for some issues before any activities occur for other
issues.296
292. Cf. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 360 (2013)
(“Only the dissenting Justices [in Twombly and Iqbal] paid attention to the possibility that there
were procedural pathways other than heightened pleading that might ameliorate these concerns
[of high costs, frivolous litigation, and extorted settlements] and that institutional and societal
values also were at stake.”). Professor Warren Schwartz recognized this potential nearly fifty
years ago, arguing that more efficient litigation was necessary and that staged litigation was
superior to limiting discovery or substituting summary disposition for trial. Warren F. Schwartz,
Severance—A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome
of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1197–98 (1967). In the intervening years, Professor
Schwartz’s superior solution has all but disappeared from discourse, while his inferior solutions
have come to pass.
293. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1186, 1222.
294. Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
295. See infra Part IV.C.2.
296. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1186 (“Nor has there been much attention to the optimal
structure of multistage adjudication: when to have distinct stages, how many, what issues and
evidence to consider at each, and in what order.”). Aside from Louis Kaplow’s recent article
discussed in the text, the most extensive academic treatment of the issue appears to be an article
from the 1960s. See Schwartz, supra note 292, at 1197–98 (analyzing and endorsing “severance”
of issues with discovery and trial on some issues occurring before others). More recently, the
issue has received occasional passing reference in debates over modern litigation reform. See
Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with Special
Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 206 (offering a brief discussion of “stagger[ing]
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The important exception is Professor Louis Kaplow’s recent
pathbreaking article Multistage Adjudication, which takes a
comprehensive and detailed look at multistage decision making—
whether to terminate investigation or to continue to a next stage
involving additional expenditures that generate further information—
with a particular focus on American civil litigation.297 Although
Kaplow’s primary interest is in how decision makers should make the
preliminary or early stage decision, he also considers how to structure
multistage adjudication, including when to have distinct stages, what
issues and evidence to consider at each stage, and in what order.298
Although Kaplow is careful to emphasize that these questions are
context specific and dependent on difficult empirical questions, his
analysis is broadly supportive of the concept of staged litigation
proposed here. Specifically, he suggests that determining whether
staging litigation is optimal requires primarily a balance of the
likelihood that the information at the first stage will justify termination
(“diagnosticity”), the size of the cost savings from not having to incur
the later stages (“cost”), and the extent of duplication of efforts if later
stages do occur (“synergy costs”).299 Further, he suggests that a “step
with a higher diagnosticity/cost ratio” should occur before other steps in
the litigation.300 The concept of staged litigation advanced here—
litigating potentially case-dispositive and more discovery-intensive
issues first—largely tracks these guideposts offered by Kaplow.
2. Staged Litigation v. Trial Bifurcation
Unlike staged litigation, trial bifurcation, has been the subject of
voluminous analysis.301 The key difference between staged litigation
and bifurcated trials is the amount of litigation activities that are phased.
Bifurcated trials separate issues for separate trials—often a trial on
liability followed by a trial on damages—with the latter trial(s)
unnecessary if the defendant prevails in the earlier phase(s). Trial
bifurcation normally occurs without any additional phasing of discovery
or other litigation activities.302 Thus, litigation is unitary until the point
the discovery load so that the initial round of discovery covers those targeted points of
controversy that are most salient to the litigation in question”); Miller, supra note 113, at 116
(making passing reference to “phasing or logically sequencing discovery, so that possible silverbullet issues can be identified to promote the acceleration of a resolution on the merits”).
297. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1180.
298. Id. at 1186–87.
299. Id. at 1223–24.
300. Id. at 1225.
301. Stevenson, supra note 291, at 228–35 (summarizing literature).
302. Moore, supra note 278, at 236; John P. Rowley III & Richard G. Moore, Bifurcation of
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of trial, at which point it becomes phased. Figure 1 depicts traditional
bifurcated trials:
FIGURE 1: Bifurcated Trials

By contrast, in addition to separate trials for separate issues, staged
litigation phases discovery and other litigation activities into different
stages for different issues. Figure 2 depicts staged litigation:
FIGURE 2: Staged Litigation

Civil Trials, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2010).
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To the extent that phasing of discovery and other activities already
occurs in civil litigation, it is most commonly just to encourage
settlement or determine the relevance of additional discovery, not to
also promote phased resolution.303 Truly staged litigation—with
discovery, resolution, and all other activities phased by issue—remains
rare, despite the significant attention paid to bifurcated trials.
The narrow focus on bifurcated trials, rather than fully staged
litigation, is somewhat surprising. Trial only occurs in a small
percentage of civil litigation,304 so any benefits from bifurcated trials
are trivial compared to the potential benefits of completely staged
litigation.305 Or perhaps it is not surprising. Staged litigation is
contrary to the American vision of “the trial as a discrete and dramatic
event rather than a series of interviews conducted over an extended
period.”306 As a result, courts presume unitary litigation and trial and
impose a heavy burden to depart from this norm.307 Moreover, staged
litigation is not ideal from either plaintiffs’ or defendants’ perspective,
even if it may be socially optimal. Plaintiffs benefit from the in
terrorem effect of unitary discovery and trials,308 and plaintiffs’ interests
303. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in
the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1566–67 (1994) (describing phased discovery where the most
important discovery occurs first but without also discussing phased resolution).
304. Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling is Better Than Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html?_r=0.
305. See Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1227 (“First, attention is often devoted to the conduct of
trial whereas much of the savings may be at the pretrial phase, notably, the conduct of discovery
in the context of U.S. civil litigation.”).
306. Carrington, supra note 263, at 2070.
307. See, e.g., F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387 (M.D.N.C.
1999) (“[T]he bifurcation of issues and the separate trial of them is not the usual course of events.
Nothing else appearing, a single trial will be more expedient and efficient. The party requesting
separate trials bears the burden . . . .” (citing Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, 172
F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.P.R. 1997); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 35 (D. Del. 1995);
Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977 (D. Del. 1982); Brad Ragan, Inc. v.
Shrader’s Inc., 89 F.R.D. 548, 550 (S.D. Ohio 1981))).
308. Because defendants tend to have more discoverable information than plaintiffs, the costs
of unitary discovery tend to give plaintiffs more leverage in settlement. See JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-40 to -41 (“Some cases involve what often is
called ‘information asymmetry.’ One party—often an individual plaintiff—may have very little
discoverable information. The other party may have vast amounts of information . . . . In
practice these circumstances often mean that the burden of responding to discovery lies heavier
on the party who has more information, and properly so.”). Similarly, juries are generally
perceived as pro-plaintiff (perhaps incorrectly). See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by
Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2005)
(stating that “[t]he popular view is that juries are pro-plaintiff decisionmaking bodies” but noting
empirical research questioning the popular view). Moreover, a unitary trial ensures that the
injured plaintiff will be able to tell the jury of its injuries, which may sway jury outcomes.
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see any deviation from the litigation system created in 1938 as favoring
defendants.309 Defendants’ interests, by contrast, are more concerned
with mitigating the broad substantive rights and doctrines of the modern
American legal system than with designing a litigation procedure that
faithfully enforces substantive law in the most efficient way. 310
3. Staging Patent Litigation
Staged litigation seems particularly promising in patent cases. The
most logical staging of patent litigation would involve an initial phase
for liability issues (infringement and invalidity) and a second phase for
damages and willfulness.311 The core liability issues of infringement
and invalidity are the issues with the greatest likelihood to terminate the
case without the need for further proceedings because a finding of
noninfringement or invalidity conclusively resolves the case. At the
same time, as Part III showed, they are also the issues with lower
discovery costs, at least as compared to remedial patent issues. In
Kaplow’s terminology, patent liability issues of infringement and
invalidity have a very high diagnosticity/cost ratio. Moreover,
infringement and invalidity are generally distinct from remedial issues
and subject to different proof using different witnesses (fact and expert)
and documents.312 As a result, the synergy costs of staging patent
litigation would be fairly low. Thus, patent litigation seems like a
natural candidate for staged litigation, with infringement and invalidity
conclusively resolved before any discovery or other litigation occurs on
remedial issues.313
It is not unusual in patent litigation to bifurcate trials between
Stevenson, supra note 291, at 228–31.
309. See Miller, supra note 292, at 366 (“It should be obvious that [recent] procedural stop
signs primarily further the interests of defendants, particularly those who are repeat players in the
civil justice arena—large businesses and governmental entities.”).
310. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 610 (2010) (suggesting that defendants’ efforts at discovery
reform are primarily about avoiding substantive rules and regulations).
311. For substantive reasons, other commentators have suggested staging invalidity and
infringement. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 71, 119–22 (2013) (arguing litigating invalidity before infringement will eliminate more
“bad” patents). This section focuses on staging liability and remedial issues because it offers the
greatest potential for reducing discovery costs, the focus of current patent reform efforts.
312. See Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387–88 (“[L]iability and damages are [not] so
inextricably interwoven that separation will render both trials unfair because of confusion and
uncertainty.” (citing Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964))).
313. Early voluntary or mandatory disclosure of limited financial information may be useful
to promoting settlement. Provided this is limited to basic finances like units sold and revenues,
rather than the full panoply of information relevant to the reasonable royalty, it poses little threat
to the efficiencies of staged litigation.
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liability and damages/willfulness.314 And this is normally the division
proposed in the occasional case where fully staged litigation is
requested.315 But fully staged patent litigation is virtually unheard
of.316 A staged patent case would start as most cases do under patent
local rules. The parties would exchange contentions on infringement
and invalidity, as well as technical documents about the conception and
reduction to practice of the invention, the structure and operation of the
accused product, and the allegedly invalidating prior art.317 Claim
construction would occur approximately one year after filing.318
Because the necessary technical documents would have already been
exchanged, liability issues could then be ready for trial in an additional
seven to eight months.319 Thus, liability issues would be ready for trial
approximately 600 days from filing. By comparison, the normal time to
trial in busy patent districts is nearly a year longer.320 If liability is
established, a period of fact discovery (e.g., six months), expert
discovery (e.g., two months), and motions and pretrial proceedings
(e.g., six months) would be required on remedial issues. The total time
from filing to complete trial, even with staged litigation, would be
approximately 1025 days, not significantly more than the present norm
314. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D. Del. 1995) (“Historically,
courts have found it worthwhile to hold separate trials on liability and damage issues in patent
cases.”).
315. See id. at 31–32 (describing defendant’s motion for separate trials on liability and
damages/willfulness and to stay discovery on damages/willfulness until after liability trial).
316. Moore, supra note 278, at 236 (“In short, when bifurcation is granted, it is bifurcation of
the trials only, not discovery.”). By contrast, staging patent litigation between liability and
damages (“quantification”) is the norm in Canada. See Model Bifurcation Order, Fed. Ct. of
Can., http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/Notices (model order for
bifurcating litigation of liability and damages).
317. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 3-1 to 4 (providing a process for exchange of infringement
and invalidity contentions and technical documents).
318. Under the patent local rules adopted in many districts, claim construction is ready for
resolution within six months of the case management conference. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 3-1
to 4-6 (requiring infringement contentions fourteen days after case management conference,
invalidity contentions forty-five days after infringement contentions, joint claim construction
chart and hearing statement sixty days after invalidity contentions, opening claim construction
brief forty-five days after joint claim construction chart, responsive claim construction brief
fourteen days after opening brief, reply claim construction brief seven days after responsive brief,
and claim construction hearing two weeks after reply brief).
319. An efficient, but reasonable, schedule is as follows: From the claim construction order,
thirty days for opening expert reports; fourteen days for rebuttal expert reports; fourteen days for
expert depositions; fourteen days for dispositive motions to be filed; thirty days from filing of
dispositive motions to hearing; thirty days from hearing to resolution of dispositive motions; sixty
days from resolution of dispositive motions to the pre-trial conference; thirty days from the pretrial conference to trial.
320. Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling 33 (July 6, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Southern California Law Review).
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of 938 days.321
If any of the more discovery-intensive technical issues are raised, the
stages may need to be designed differently. For example, if the accused
infringer disputed that it made, sold, offered for sale, used, or imported
the accused product in the United States during the patent term, the
technical issues could still be resolved first to reach a decision as to
whether the accused product satisfied the claim limitations.322 Then the
question of whether the requisite act was committed in the United States
could be decided either in an intermediate stage or as part of the
remedial stage. A similar approach could apply in cases with indirect
infringement allegations, with the question of whether the product at
issue meets the claim limitations decided in the first phase and the
question of requisite knowledge and intent being decided in a later
stage.
Secondary considerations of nonobviousness pose the greatest
obstacle to staged patent litigation. These can be discovery intensive,
but they also are difficult to separate from the technical issues. Doing
so could create Seventh Amendment problems because the two are
tightly intertwined: the purpose of secondary considerations is to rebut
the prima facie case of obviousness. 323 Additional discovery narrowly
tailored to the secondary considerations issue could be allowed in the
technical stage. Because such evidence also may be relevant to
damages, there could be some limited duplication from such an
approach.
However, since any documents, interrogatories, and
admissions provided on secondary considerations could also be used in
the remedial phase without additional effort, the duplication would be
limited to, at most, depositions of a few witnesses. It is doubtful this
limited potential duplication outweighs the benefits of staged litigation.
Alternatively, secondary considerations discovery could be postponed
until after dispositive motions occur in the technical phase. The prima
facie case of obviousness could be first tested via summary judgment
motion before undertaking limited secondary considerations discovery.
Staged patent litigation offers significant benefits in patent cases
similar to in other types of litigation, like reducing costs,
disincentivizing weak claims, and encouraging resolution on the
merits.324 Moreover, patent trials have been criticized for focusing on

321. Id.
322. Alternatively, if the act of infringement issue is significant, it could be addressed in a
first stage before reaching the technical issues.
323. See infra Part IV.C.4.
324. The lack of resolution on the merits may be more problematic in patent cases than other
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ancillary issues, like narratives of the “good” inventor versus the “bad”
copier, rather than on core technical issues. By focusing the first stage
just on technical issues not amenable to these sort of ancillary issues,
staged litigation can promote fidelity to the technical merits of the
patent and prior art.
4. Staged Litigation Beyond Patent Litigation
Civil litigation is at a crossroads. Commentators recognize that civil
litigation has entered a new era that departs from strict adherence to the
values and system embodied in the 1938 enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.325 Procedural reforms “favor[] increasingly early
case disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoidance of
abusive and meritless lawsuits” and “retreat from the principles of
citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of
litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated
wealth.”326 However, rather than embrace the new era in civil litigation
and debate how to design reforms that still preserve other values like
access to courts, many commentators instead bemoan any departure
from the Federal Rules’ procedural system.327
Yet, procedural reform is inevitable. “The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated in 1938, and, needless to say, things are
much different today than they were then.”328 The intervening years
“have witnessed the most extraordinary growth in federal and state
substantive law in this country’s history,” dramatically increasing the
total amount of litigation in federal courts.329 Moreover, litigation
today tends to be exponentially more complex in terms of subject
matter, legal doctrine, number of parties, number of claims, and crossborder interactions.330 This complexity implicates a far wider range of
information and sources of information. The corporations that tend to

cases. See generally Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 375 (2014) (arguing that settlement of patent cases sometimes is against the public
interest because it fails to eradicate invalid patents).
325. Subrin & Main, supra note 65, at 1856.
326. Miller, supra note 113, at 10.
327. Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1234–
36 (2008) (describing the majority of academic commentary as “traditionalist,” and objecting to
litigation reforms simply because they depart from the principles of the 1938 enactment of the
Federal Rules).
328. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621,
1630 (2012).
329. Miller, supra note 292, at 292.
330. Id. at 290–91.
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be defendants also are bigger and more complex, making it more costly
and difficult to find all information in their possession that might relate
to the case.331 Finally, due to the rise of computers, electronic
documents, and electronic communications, people today create and
retain dramatically greater volumes of information than in 1938.332 In
light of all these changes, “[i]t is not surprising” that reforms would be
needed.333 Even if one is unwilling to accept that procedural reform is
necessary, it is hard to dispute that procedural reform is inevitable given
the political influence of the large corporate interests most burdened by
the broad 1938 procedural system.334
As even Professor Miller, one of the staunchest defenders of the old
procedural system, has recognized, the real task is to “reconcile the
continuing viability of the values of 1938 with the realities of 2010, and
find a way to uphold the principle of access and the other policy
objectives underlying the original Rules while adjusting to
contemporary litigation conditions.”335 Commentators have begun to
suggest such ways to reform civil litigation, while preserving other
values like access to courts, including a “simple case track” for federal
district courts,336 some form of discovery cost shifting,337 and an
enhanced motion for a more definite statement under Federal Rule
12(e).338
The example of patent litigation suggests that staged litigation may
be a promising alternative. As discussed above, it addresses the primary
concerns motivating modern procedural reforms like the Federal Rules
amendments and the heightened pleading requirements of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly339 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,340 namely that “the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”341 The dissent in
Twombly even noted the possibility of something similar to staged

331. Fitzpatrick, supra note 328, at 1638.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1634.
334. See Miller, supra note 292, at 366–67 (“I think it is fair to say that a number of the
Justices (as well as other federal judges) have a predilection (perhaps subliminal) that favors
business and governmental interests.”).
335. Miller, supra note 113, at 104.
336. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 409–12 (2011).
337. Fitzpatrick, supra note 328, at 1644–46.
338. Miller, supra note 113, at 104.
339. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
340. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
341. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
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litigation: “a plan of ‘phased discovery’ limited to the existence of the
alleged conspiracy and class certification.”342 Similarly, a few
commentators have suggested a procedure resembling a limited form of
staged litigation in response to Twombly and Iqbal: “[G]ive the plaintiff
a chance to conduct limited discovery before deciding a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for a more definite
statement.”343
Staged litigation avoids the problems identified with the Federal
Rules amendments, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, and other recent
efforts to reform civil litigation: burdening meritorious claims,
perversely denying plaintiffs discovery of the information they need to
establish the merits of their claims, undermining the benefits of trial by
jury, and applying indiscriminately even to non-mega cases where there
is no cost problem.344 Staged litigation targets cost savings at the least
meritorious claims that offer no societal benefits to offset the
deadweight loss imposed by litigation costs. Discovery is limited to one
or a few issues, preferably less discovery-intensive issues, until the
plaintiff demonstrates a meritorious case by prevailing on the initial
issue(s). As a result, the most expensive discovery is saved for the most
meritorious cases (as demonstrated by resolution of the initial issues),
where it is most needed to insure optimal deterrence, compensation, or
other substantive objectives. However, before the merits are evaluated,
plaintiffs are given full discovery on the issue(s) to be resolved in the
first stage, insuring that they have the information necessary to
demonstrate their claim is meritorious. Moreover, staged litigation does
not require any artificial decision about whether the claim is meritorious
enough to proceed, a decision that is likely to be subjective and
unpredictable.345 Rather, the merits are screened using the normal
means for determining the merits of a claim, including trial by jury if
appropriate.
In sum, staged litigation preserves the values many deem important
about the 1938 procedural system, including liberal discovery and trial
342. Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873, 933 (2009).
344. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 879–81 (2010) (criticizing Iqbal based on the
burden on meritorious cases and the denial of information needed to establish merits); Miller,
supra note 292, at 306 (criticizing recent procedural reforms for undermining adjudication on the
merits and trial by jury); Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78
(criticizing discovery reforms based on the burden on meritorious cases and the application to
non-mega cases where no discovery problem exists).
345. Spencer, supra note 284, at 1733.
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by jury. What it alters is when the plaintiff can get liberal discovery and
trial by jury. Rather than giving every plaintiff who files a complaint
full discovery and a complete resolution by trial, staged litigation
rations these expensive procedures, allowing the plaintiff discovery and
resolution on a few limited issues first but then requiring some proof of
a meritorious claim—by prevailing on the initial issues—before
allowing the remainder of discovery and resolution. Finally, staged
litigation necessarily must be tailored for different substantive areas and
more or less staging can be used as appropriate in light of the cost and
complexity of litigation in different substantive areas. In fact, some
substantive areas—or cases of certain stakes—might have just a single
“stage” indistinguishable from unitary litigation.346
Whether staged litigation ultimately proves to be an optimal reform
in areas other than patent litigation will require careful analysis of the
issues and evidence in various substantive areas, an analysis that is
beyond the scope of this Article. This will depend on whether some
issues are case dispositive, whether the potentially case-dispositive
issues are also low-discovery issues, and to what extent there is overlap
between discovery needed for case-dispositive or low-discovery issues
and discovery needed for other issues.347
It is certainly possible that patent litigation will prove to be an outlier
in this regard. Perhaps patent litigation is unique in that the most
intensive discovery issues (damages and willfulness) can be separated
from, and resolved after, less discovery-intensive, but potentially
dispositive, issues (infringement and invalidity). That is, perhaps staged
litigation is a unique solution only applicable to patent litigation to the
common discovery problem faced in patent litigation and other mega
cases. Such a unique solution to a common problem might warrant
treating patent litigation differently than other civil litigation, i.e., patent
exceptionalism. Yet, given the increasing focus on balancing the need
to reduce discovery costs with the need to maintain access to courts and
the promising potential of staged litigation in this regard, staged
litigation’s potential in other areas of law is certainly worth exploring

346. For example, social security cases are 6% of the federal civil docket. See U.S. COURTS,
supra note 98, at tbl.C-2 (listing 303,820 total civil cases filed in twelve months ending March
31, 2014, 19,636 of which were social security cases). These cases are unlikely to require
significant discovery and instead are likely to be resolvable on the administrative record.
Similarly, consumer credit cases are 3% of the federal civil docket and also are unlikely to require
significant discovery. Id. (listing 8,480 consumer credit cases). Staged litigation would offer
little benefit in these types of cases.
347. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1223–28 (examining factors for determining whether
multistage adjudication is warranted).
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before consigning it only to patent litigation.
5. Implementing Staged Litigation
Staged litigation already lies within judges’ discretion and can be
imposed even if neither plaintiffs nor defendants are necessarily
enthusiastic.348 In theory, judges should use their discretion to impose
staged litigation in cases where it is warranted and deny staged litigation
when its costs exceed its benefits. Yet, judges almost never implement
staged litigation.349 To some extent, this is because judges share the
American predilection for trial as a singular, dramatic event.350 But
judges also seem to overvalue their personal self-interest, emphasizing
the need for multiple hearings and trials in staged litigation, and
undervalue the savings that would occur for other aspects of litigation
where the judge is not present, such as discovery. 351 Finally, judges
demonstrate a (perhaps unsurprising) narrow focus on the case at hand,
rather than taking a more general or systemic perspective. For example,
judges refuse to weigh the possibility that the defendant will prevail in
the first stage, thereby eliminating the need for further discovery and
litigation, because they do not have enough information to evaluate the
merits in the specific case.352 In doing so, they overlook that,
statistically, defendants will prevail in a significant percentage of
cases.353
Judges’ resistance to staged litigation provides an important lesson.
If staged litigation is left to individual judges’ discretion, their self-

348. Rowley & Moore, supra note 302, at 18.
349. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387 (M.D.N.C. 1999)
(“[T]he bifurcation of issues and the separate trial of them is not the usual course of events.”).
350. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. James River Corp. of Va., 131 F.R.D. 607, 608 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (quoting Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1323–24 (5th
Cir. 1976)) (“In considering such a course, the court should remain mindful of the traditional rule
of the factfinder; i.e., to make an ultimate determination on the basis of a case presented in its
entirety. . . . [B]ifurcation works an infringement on such an important aspect of the judicial
process . . . .”)
351. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 35 (D. Del. 1995)
(emphasizing efficiency of one trial while giving limited consideration to efficiency in nontrial
portions of the litigation).
352. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Ill.
2006) (“Although defendants’ argument that separate trials would promote judicial economy if
defendants prevail, is true, they have not demonstrated that such success is likely.”); Johns
Hopkins, 160 F.R.D. at 35 (“[T]he court is not in a position to fairly evaluate CellPro’s claim that
there is a substantial probability it will prevail on liability.”).
353. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1136 (1992) (providing plaintiff trial win rates by
category of cases and showing that plaintiffs generally win in only one-half to two-thirds of
cases).
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interest or narrow focus will undermine the potential systemic benefits.
For staged litigation to be most effective, it must be mandated or
otherwise imposed at a systemic level. District judge discretion could
be maintained but guided in favor of staged litigation by flipping the
presumption in favor of staged litigation, with exceptions in only
limited, defined situations, such as when the amount in controversy is
below a certain threshold, the type of case is particularly routine or
simple, or other strong justifications exist for unitary proceedings.
Alternatively, staged litigation could be mandated for certain issues
in certain types of cases.354 Neither Congress nor the Judicial
Conference can reasonably be expected to have the substantive
expertise necessary to do so. Instead, Congress or the Judicial
Conference could provide the basic framework and empower
committees with substantive expertise in specific subjects and
representing diverse interests—plaintiffs, defendants, judges, and
academics—to develop presumptive or mandatory staging plans for
different types of cases. Similar committees have been used quite
successfully to develop local rules for structuring patent cases in a
variety of districts, and these rules are widely seen as evenhanded and
beneficial.355 The committees’ plans would identify the various issues,
the order of resolution, and exceptions to applicability of the staging
order. This approach would offer a transsubstantive framework to solve
problems that span subject matters but would maximize the
effectiveness of the framework by tailoring it to the nature and needs of
different areas.
While part of the resistance to staged litigation is simply self-interest
or irrational commitment to the “dramatic” trial, three legitimate, but
ultimately misguided, concerns require further consideration. First,
staged litigation is said to increase costs through duplication if the case
is not terminated in the first phase.356 This argument understates the
likelihood that the case will be terminated at the end of the first phase.

354. Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (2015) (“In any claim alleging punitive or
exemplary damages, before any discovery relating thereto may be commenced and before any
such claim may be submitted to the finder of fact, the court shall find, after a hearing and based
upon clear and convincing evidence, that there is a reasonable basis to believe that there has been
willful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the party claimed against.”).
355. See, e.g., Kennelly & Manzo, supra note 230 (describing widespread demand for and
acceptance of patent local rules).
356. See, e.g., Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 387, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Remcor Prods. Co. v. Servend Int’l, Inc., No. 93 C 1823, 1994 WL 594723, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 28, 1994)) (“Rather than furthering convenience and judicial economy, separate trials
would result in duplication of effort due to the overlapping evidence required to establish both
liability and willfulness.”).
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Even if only one-third of cases are resolved in the first phase, the
amount of duplication that must occur in the other two-thirds of cases
will have to be substantial to offset the savings from eliminating any
further activities in the terminated third. Moreover, the early resolution
of a key, dispositive issue in the plaintiffs’ favor may reduce
divergences in the parties’ expected outcomes, promoting settlements
that otherwise would not occur and generating additional savings. And
carefully drawn staging plans can minimize the amount of duplication.
Ultimately, staged litigation’s effect on costs will depend on the issues
involved, how intertwined or severable they are, and whether less
discovery-intensive issues are case dispositive and capable of being
litigated before other issues. These considerations demonstrate the need
for staging plans that vary among substantive areas.
Second, and relatedly, staged litigation is said to increase the length
of litigation in contravention of the Federal Rules’ goal of speedy
resolution.357 This argument assumes that the first stage of litigation
will take as long to complete as unitary litigation and therefore any
second stage will necessarily prolong the litigation. However, because
staged litigation is more focused, the first stage can reach resolution
quicker than unitary litigation. As a result, staged litigation will be
quicker than unitary litigation in the significant proportion of cases in
which the defendant prevails on the first issue. And early resolution of
a key, potentially dispositive issue in the plaintiffs’ favor should
promote settlements after the first stage that would not occur in unitary
litigation. Even cases that proceed through all stages may not take
much longer than unitary litigation, though the time would be
apportioned differently.358 Rather than a long discovery period, a long
pretrial period, and a long trial, there would be multiple shorter
discovery, pretrial, and trial periods. Thus, while litigation may take
longer in some staged cases, there is little reason to think that either
cumulative or average per-case litigation time will increase.359
Third, the Seventh Amendment is an oft-cited obstacle to any form of
nonunitary litigation. The Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the

357. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins, 160 F.R.D. at 35 (“A single trial followed by an appeal is the
best procedure for the court to follow in working to achieve our goal under the Civil Justice
Reform Act of resolving litigation within eighteen months after the filing of the complaint.”).
358. Cf. Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 720 (2000)
(describing a 1960s study of bifurcated trials finding that multiple split trials were no longer, and
perhaps shorter, than unitary trials).
359. Cf. id. at 706–07 (arguing that trial bifurcation will generally shorten litigation).
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United States.”360 The Seventh Amendment issue is largely a red
herring. “The criteria is not whether the same evidence is presented at
both trials, but rather whether the same essential issues will be
decided.”361 Thus, as long as staged litigation is designed to insure the
issues in the separate stages are truly distinct and separable, even if
some evidence may be common, the Seventh Amendment does not bar
staged litigation.362 Alternatively, the same jury could be recalled at
multiple phases of a trial.363
Given the limited attention truly staged litigation has received in
American jurisprudence, these potential obstacles have largely been
discussed in the context of bifurcated trials. Other concerns have also
been raised in that context that might apply to truly staged litigation,
including that nonunitary resolution leads to more defense verdicts,
prevents jurors from reaching “compromise” verdicts that impose
liability but low damages, and takes issues out of their full context.364
Resolution of these arguments largely depends on one’s view of the
appropriate substantive outcome or role of the jury. But, importantly,
whatever the validity of these “costs” in evaluating bifurcated trials, the
analysis is different for truly staged litigation. Because the potential
benefits of staged litigation are so much greater than bifurcated trials—
both cumulatively (vastly more cases reach discovery than trial) and
individually (staged litigation saves both discovery and trial costs)—any
problems with staged litigation must be substantially greater than with
bifurcated trials to make the procedure not cost justified.
CONCLUSION
Too often, patent litigation is treated as a unique area of law distinct
from general civil litigation. This “patent exceptionalism” has been
criticized for causing patent litigation to ignore the lessons and
doctrines developed in other areas of law. This Article demonstrates a

360. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
361. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 388 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
362. Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for
Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 704 (2006) (“Although there may be some
overlapping of evidence in different segments of a bifurcated case, courts have generally found
that such issues as liability, damages, causation, and affirmative defenses satisfy the ‘distinct and
separable’ test, and there is no violation of the Seventh Amendment.”). The second jury can be
instructed to accept the results of the first jury.
363. For jurors, it is probably preferable to have to appear for two or three mini-trials (e.g.,
two to three days) over a period of months or years than to be absent from their jobs, families, or
responsibilities for two or more straight weeks. Multiple alternate jurors can be used to mitigate
the risk that one or two jurors will be lost in the time between phases.
364. Stevenson, supra note 301, at 228–35 (summarizing literature).
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second problem with “patent exceptionalism”: the lessons of patent
litigation are ignored in debates over how to structure and improve civil
litigation generally.
Both of these problems are evident in discovery reform. Patent
reform efforts assume that patent discovery is uniquely problematic—
whether due to its supposedly disproportionate costs or the abuses of
patent assertion entities—and therefore in need of patent-specific
solutions. Civil litigation reform ignores patent litigation, even though
it offers a perfect example of the complex, high stakes cases widely
acknowledged as having problematic discovery.
Linking patent discovery reform with general civil discovery reform
is productive. Looking carefully at the discovery problems in patent
litigation, and their causes, suggests a solution with potential benefits
well beyond patent cases: staged litigation. To date, staged litigation
has remained on the fringes of American procedure because it
challenges the trial as a singular, dramatic event. But it is the most
promising way to reduce the costs of litigation while maintaining other
values deemed important, like access to information and the jury trial.
If we are committed to these values, as well as the broad substantive
rights and broad substantive doctrines of modern America, then staged
litigation may be the only, or best, hope for making litigation more
efficient. Viewed this way, the continued commitment to the trial as
singular, dramatic event seems irrational, naïve, and antiquated.
Staged litigation is one example of the need to rethink the way
litigation is structured to confront the realities of modern litigation.
Through joinder and preclusion rules, the American system encourages
the bundling of issues into a single case. But the commitment to the
trial as a singular, dramatic event then forces these bundled issues into
unitary resolution. This has proven problematic as American society,
business, and litigation become increasingly complex.

